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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
Spillover effects and systemic risk contribution of institutions, as measured by their 
CoVaR and ΔCoVaR respectively, is one way of assessing risk both for an 
institution in isolation, as well as for regulators and the economy as a whole. 
CoVaR is the q%-VaR of an institution conditional on another institution already 
being at its q%-VaR level, whereas ΔCoVaR measures each institution’s marginal 
risk contribution. This essay applies the CoVaR methodology proposed by Adrian 
and Brunnermeier (2011) on the Nordic stock market (OMX Nordic 40 Index) in 
order to measure systemic risk contribution of 36 firms on this market, during the 
period January 2002 to March 2014. Publicly available stock market data is used to 
estimate abovementioned measures by applying quantile regression. The results, 
which are aggregated at sector level, suggest that systemic risk contribution is 
higher during times of financial distress and sectors generally show a similar 
pattern in how risky they are over time. VaR is further not positively correlated 
with CoVaR, i.e. even if a sector is considered risky in isolation as measured by its 
VaR, it is not necessarily the case that it spills over this risk to other 
sectors/institutions. However, there are some sectors that contribute more to 
systemic risk than they are risky in isolation, as measured by their ΔCoVaR and 
VaR.  Sectors contributing the most to Nordic systemic risk are Forestry and 
Construction, as well as the European stock market as measured by the 
EuroStoxx50 Index. The banks included in the OMX Nordic 40 Index are also 
examined in a separate case study, finding Swedbank the most risky and Nordea 
the least risky in isolation, but the other way around when measuring risk 
contribution (ΔCoVaR) of these two banks, to other banks.  
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1 Introduction 
Globalisation, increased integration and innovation in the financial and corporate 
markets have been the key drivers towards creating a globally intertwined financial 
system. Creating many benefits for the institutions involved, as well as for the real 
economy as a whole, financial advancement also comes at a cost.  New channels of 
shock transmission arise due to the interconnectedness of institutions, and as we 
have observed during the recent global financial and Eurozone crises, externalities 
in the form of spillover effects are rules rather than exceptions.  
 
Spillover effects are negative externalities arising from the integration of firms’ 
financial activities. If mapped properly, they can be used to identify to what extent 
firms are linked and how they contribute to the probability of the entire financial 
system to collapse, i.e. how they contribute to systemic risk. Systemic risk is rarely 
brought up in typical finance textbooks and there is no unanimous definition of it. 
Instead, a lot of focus is put on market and/or credit risk where assets, firms or 
other entities are examined in isolation. So far, financial regulation such as Basel I 
and II has taken this stand-alone, micro prudential, approach in regulating the 
financial markets. As opposed to a macro prudential approach, which is being 
considered in Basel III, a micro prudential approach focuses on idiosyncratic risks 
of institutions rather than taking into account the risks that arise due to 
interaction between institutions. Hence, systemic risk is gaining the attention it 
needs by the inclusion of macro prudential parameters in financial legislation.   
 
When discussing financial markets, one usually thinks of banks and other 
institutions associated with finance and financial activity. This is also the case 
when considering what research has been performed on systemic risk; financial 
institutions are considered being most risky and systemically important. Clearly, it 
is important to monitor, regulate and evaluate financial institutions but another 
growing perspective of systemic risk considers evaluating firms that on the one 
hand rely on credit from financial institutions, and on the other also create value 
for them. This essay does not specifically focus on the financial market per se, but 
instead considers the different firms and sectors that form the Nordic stock market, 
OMX Nordic 40 Index, and examines their contribution to Nordic systemic risk. As 
a case study, the banks included in the OMX Nordic 40 Index are also examined 
within the same framework. Systemic risk contribution is examined through the 
estimation of CoVaR, first presented by Adrian and Brunnermeier in 2011.  
 
It is important to analyse the interconnection of institutions and to what extent 
these institutions, or sectors, are contributing to the over all systemic risk in order 
to maintain a well functioning risk management system and mitigate spillover 
effects. Regulating and monitoring systemic risk is not only important for the real 
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economy but also among corporate institutions that wish to minimise their risk 
exposure.  
 
The study by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), CoVaR, serves as a foundation for 
this essay and the results obtained here are to a large extent based on replicating 
this study. CoVaR is a risk measure developed in response to VaR being an 
insufficient measure and that takes into account that there might exist different 
linkages between institutions having an impact on institution risk and performance 
in isolation. As far as the author is concerned, systemic risk contribution of Nordic 
firms has not yet been evaluated with the CoVaR methodology.  
 
The aim of this essay is to examine systemically important firms on the Nordic 
stock market, as represented by the OMX Nordic 40 stock index. This is 
accomplished by applying the CoVaR methodology by Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2011) to calculate each firm’s systemic risk contribution on a sector basis. As a 
special case study, banks in particular are also examined in order to identify their 
risk linkages. The remainder of this essay is structured as follows; next follows a 
more detailed description of the problem formulation and the idea examined. 
Third, we assess existing literature on the topic of systemic risk and systemic risk 
contribution. Fourth, a brief theoretical framework is proposed where different risk 
measures are explained intuitively and formally. In chapter 5 we present the 
CoVaR estimation methodology and distinguish between a conditional and 
unconditional way of estimating CoVaR. The data is presented in chapter 6 and we 
find the empirical results in chapter 7, following a case study in chapter 8. The 
essay concludes with a summary including the main conclusions.  
 
2 Problem formulation 
The purpose of this essay is to quantify the level of systemic risk contribution in 
the Nordic stock market by identifying spillover effects of firms and sectors in this 
market using Adrian and Brunnermeier’s CoVaR methodology. More specifically, 
the results of this essay attempt to answer the following questions: 
 
Which sectors have the highest CoVaR? 
Which sectors have the highest ΔCoVaR? 
 
The first question is necessary to assess in order for the second question to be 
answered, however this essay focuses on the results of the second question. Both 
questions are nonetheless important. The first question deals with estimating 
spillover effects of firms onto the financial system, by means of CoVaR. That is, 
estimating the 1%-VaR of the Nordic stock market conditional on a firm already 
being at it’s 1%-VaR level. The ΔCoVaR enables estimation of each firm’s 
marginal contribution to Nordic systemic risk by taking the above estimated 1%-
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CoVaR minus the 50%-CoVaR ( 50%-CoVaR is the 1%-VaR of the Nordic system 
conditional on a firm in the system being at it’s 50%-VaR level). By calculating 
ΔCoVaR we are able to answer questions such as which firms are most at risk if a 
financial crisis should occur and which firms contribute the most to systemic risk 
on the Nordic stock market. The CoVaR and ΔCoVaR analyses serve as good tools 
both for the firm in isolation in terms of improving their risk management 
functions, as well as being an informative tool of a firm’s sensitivity and relative 
standing in the corporate environment should negative shocks occur in the 
economy.  
 
3 Previous research 
According to Borri et al. (2012) literature on systemic risk contribution can be 
divided into two parts; network analysis and micro-evidence. Network analysis is 
concerned with the joint loss distribution of all market participants, whereas the 
micro-evidence approach focuses on the marginal contributions of individual 
institutions (López-Espinosa et al. (2012)). The focus in this essay, as well as the 
focus of the main paper on which this essay is based (Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2011)), takes a micro-evidence approach in estimating systemic risk contribution 
and hence focus will be put on such studies in this section. For the interested 
reader, Hautsch (2012), Markose et al. (2010), Martinez-Jaramillo et al. (2010) and 
Cont et al. (2009) are examples of network analysis approaches on the topic.  
 
There are several measures when it comes to assessing systemic risk within the 
micro-evidence based approach. One of them is CoVaR, developed by Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2011) in their study with the same name. The authors propose a 
measure of systemic risk, which they denote CoVaR, with the prefix co standing for 
conditional, contagion or comovement, emphasizing the systemic nature of their 
risk measure. They define CoVaR as the VaR of a financial system j conditional on 
different institutions i being under distress, where VaR is the maximum loss that 
can occur with a specified probability during a specified time period and ‘distress’ 
is defined as an institution being at its 1%-VaR level.1  
 
Further, the marginal contribution of each institution to overall systemic risk is 
defined as CoVaR conditional on the institution i being under distress (at its 1%-
VaR level) minus the CoVaR conditional on the institution i being in its median 
state (at its 50%-VaR level). As we will investigate in depth in further sections, 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) define systemic risk contribution, ΔCoVaR of 
each institution i as follows 𝛥𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푞푗 푖 = 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푞푗 푋푖=푉푎푅푞푖 − 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅q푗 푋푖=VaR푀푒푑푖푎푛푖  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 If the terminology seems unclear at the time being, there is a very detailed explanation of VaR, CoVaR, other risk 
measures and estimation procedures in the theory and methodology sections of this essay.  
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with q being 1% in the first term and 50% in the second term on the right hand 
side of the equation. Estimations are carried out with quantile regression.2 
 
The objective of their paper is twofold; they first propose a measure for systemic 
risk as outlined above, and secondly they outline a method called forward ΔCoVaR 
which is based on current institutional characteristics such as leverage, maturity 
mismatch and size, in order to predict firms’ expected future contribution to 
systemic risk.  
 
CoVaR (and therefore ΔCoVaR) is estimated both conditionally and 
unconditionally, for 1226 financial institutions including banks and thrifts, 
investment banks, insurance companies and government-sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs) in the US during the period 1986Q1-2010Q4. The unconditional estimation 
yields a CoVaR that is constant over time whereas the conditional estimation 
models CoVaR as a function of macro variables that are assumed to capture the 
evolution of tail risk over time, beyond that resulting from firms’ asset returns and 
spillover effects. The additional macro variables include the slope of the US yield 
curve, the aggregate credit spread and the implied volatility VIX, serving as 
proxies for short-term liquidity risk, business cycle and investor sentiment. Forward 
ΔCoVaR is a forward looking measure of marginal systemic risk contribution of 
institutions constructed as regressing ΔCoVaR on different firm characteristics 
such as leverage, maturity mismatch, market-to-book value, size and equity return 
volatility. The authors conclude that characteristics such as higher leverage, more 
maturity mismatch and large size are contributing to a larger systemic risk 
contribution at both 1 % and 5 % levels. (Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011)). 
 
An important conclusion drawn from the study of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) 
is that there is a very loose link between an entity’s VaR and its contribution to 
systemic risk. This is a sign that financial regulation should not solely be based on 
VaR measures, but should rather take into account existing linkages among 
entities, when protecting against and managing systemic risk. For a more 
comprehensive presentation of the results from Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), 
see Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011).  
 
Different attempts to apply Adrian and Brunnermeier’s CoVaR methodology have 
been made since its publication in 2011. For example, Chan-Lau (2008), Wong and 
Fong (2011), Roengpitya and Rungcharoenkitkul (2011), Borri et al. (2012), Arias 
et al. (2010) and Espinosa et al. (2012) have all, more or less, applied the CoVaR 
methodology in their research.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Ibid 
	   9 
In the paper Default Risk Codependence in the Global Financial System: Was the 
Bear Stearns Bailout Justified?, Chan-Lau (2008) assesses the default risk 
codependence among 25 financial institutions in Europe, Japan and the US using 
quantile regressions and the idea of the CoVaR methodology. Risk codependence is 
here defined as the default risk of one institution conditional on the default risk of 
another institution post the correction for the effect of a number of observable 
fundamental and technical factors such as for example the slope of the US yield 
curve, excess stock market return, Libor spread and the implied volatility index 
VIX. Estimation is performed on publicly available daily market data on the 25 
financial institutions, covering a period from July 2003 to September 2008. Chan-
Lau analyses risk codependence by calculating a risk codependence coefficient and 
further examines how it varies at different levels of risk (quantiles). Quantile 
regression, as we will see in further sections, is nothing more than an optimisation 
problem and the following objective function is minimised in the study in order to 
solve for the risk codependence coefficient β at different quantiles τ. 3 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛훽 𝜌휏푁푖 (𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘푖 − 𝛽푘,휏𝑅푘 − 𝛽푗,휏𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘푗퐾푘 ) 
 
The relevance of the above problem is to asses how the risk of institution i is 
affected by the risk of institution j, controlling for K risk factors Rk where the risk 
codependence between two institutions is captured by the parameters in the vector β!,!. After having obtained risk codependence mappings the author also quantifies 
risk codependence between institutions in terms of the conditional codependence 
function for a specific quantile, measuring the percentage increase in the 
unconditional risk of firm (or financial system) i, as first proposed in Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2008), but with somewhat different notation.  
 𝐶𝑜𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘푖푗 𝜏 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 100× (𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘푖 𝜏 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘푗 𝜏 ,𝑅푘)𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘푖 𝜏 − 1  
The results indicate that there exists an upward sloping pattern when it comes to 
the average risk codependence coefficient among the 25 financial institutions, i.e. 
risk codependence is stronger in times of financial distress (high quantiles). The 
author argues that despite the fact that there is no underlying structural model for 
the results, there is evidence of a transmission channel that exists between the 
economies beyond what could be explained by the exposure of common shocks in 
the economy. Chan-Lau’s results also provide a description of the increase, in per 
cent, of the default risk of institution i when institution j is at it’s 5%-VaR. Among 
the 25 financial institutions being evaluated during the time period, Bear Stearns 
and AIG were found to be most vulnerable to default risk spillovers, where the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Again, a detailed description of the quantile regression methodology will come. 
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average conditional default risk increases 134 % and 187 % respectively, given a 
firm j being at its 5%-VaR level. (Chan-Lau (2008)). 
 
Wong and Fong (2011), in Analysing Interconnectivity Among Economies, analyse 
the interconnectivity in terms of credit risk linkages using 11 Asian-Pacific 
economies’ sovereign credit default swap spreads as the VaR variable. The CoVaR 
methodology of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) is also implemented here, but this 
time on sovereign CDS spreads of 11 Asian Pacific economies covering the period 
October 2004 to September 2009. Also here, quantile regression was implemented 
by relating economy i with economy j by the following model specification for 
q=1% where ∆X is the change in the CDS spread of economy i and where Rk is a 
vector of common macro variables 
 ∆𝑋푖 = 𝛽0,푞푖 푗 + 𝛽1,푞푖 푗∆𝑋푗 + 𝛾푘,푞푖 푗 𝑅푘 + 𝜀푞푖 푗퐾푘=1  
Here 𝛽0,푞푖 푗  represents idiosyncratic characteristics of economy i, and 𝛽1,푞푖 푗  is the 
measure of risk dependency between economy i and the risk of economy j. CoVaR 
is formed in the following way 
 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푞푖 푗 = 𝛽0,푞푖 푗 + 𝛽1,푞푖 푗 𝑉𝑎𝑅푞푗 + 𝛾푘,푞푖 푗 𝑅푘퐾푘=1  
The above equation allows estimating the maximum increase in the CDS spread 
that the economies could suffer. The authors conclude that the VaR of an Asian 
Pacific economy on average rises by 45% if another economy comes under financial 
distress, measured by the economy being at its 1%-VaR level. Indonesia and the 
Philippines are found to be most vulnerable in terms of suffering highest 
conditional risk, and Australia and New Zealand are found to be the least 
vulnerable. China and Korea are found to create the largest impact when it comes 
to risk spillover and affecting other Asian Pacific economies. Their results also 
show that risk measured by CoVaR is significantly higher than risk measured by 
standard VaR implying that there is evidence of a transmission channel among 
these economies. The authors’ results, in accordance with previous studies, are 
concluded to be stronger in distress periods than in boom times. (Wong and Fong 
(2011)). 
 
Arias et al. (2010) apply CoVaR to measure systemic market risk of Colombian 
financial institutions including pension funds, financial corporations, financial 
companies, financial cooperatives, brokerage firms, insurance companies and hedge 
funds. The data set includes weekly returns of Colombian treasury bonds of 
different duration and maturity together combined in what the authors call TES-
portfolios, owned by the above-mentioned financial institutions. VaR and CoVaR 
of these portfolios belonging to each of the mentioned financial institutions is 
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calculated using quantile regression. They conclude that sectors with high levels of 
volatility, defined by sectors that often modify the composition and size of their 
investments in Colombian treasury bonds, contribute more to systemic risk. In this 
case, it was the sectors Financial Corporations and Financial Cooperatives that had 
the highest conditional risk codependence among financial sectors and therefore 
also contributing the most to systemic risk in the Colombian market. Commercial 
banks and brokerage firms had the lowest conditional risk codependence. A 
conclusion found in previous studies that risk codependence becomes larger during 
distress period is also confirmed by Arias et al. (2010).  
 
Systemic Risk in the European Banking Sector by Borri et al. (2012) studies the 
systemic risk contribution of 223 European listed banks during the period 1999-
2012. They follow Adrian and Brunnermeier’s (2011) methodology and compute 
conditional VaR and ΔCoVaR on market valued asset returns, controlling for a set 
of macro variables that are considered important in determining asset values. These 
variables consist of the change of the DAX volatility index, a short and long term 
liquidity spread of Euribor 3M rate and German government bond yield, and 10 
year and 3M German government bond yields, respectively. As previously 
mentioned, the macro variables account for the market specific information 
available to all entities involved on the market, as opposed to firm specific 
information that determines  (extreme) asset value variation, and are included in 
the estimation in order to control for common events.  The authors also examine 
what variables are considered as good predictors of systemic risk at the individual 
bank level, using ordinary OLS estimation technique. The authors find that 
ΔCoVaR is highly persistent and that size and leverage are two predictors of 
systemic risk contribution of banks. The variable Concentration, defined as banks 
having their headquarters in a more concentrated banking system, is also shown to 
be significantly different from zero, indicating that these banks contribute more to 
European wide systemic risk than other banks. (Borri et al. (2012)). 
 
Roengpitya and Rungcharoenkitkul (2011) address systemic risk contribution in the 
Thai banking system using the CoVaR methodology. Risk contribution and 
financial linkages are quantified in a sample of Thai commercial banks covering the 
period 1996Q2 to 2009Q1, including the Asian crisis period. Daily stock market 
(equity price) data of 6 commercial banks in the Thai financial sector is used as 
their data sample. They also perform a panel data regression using bank balance 
sheet information in order to examine if ΔCoVaR in the Thai banking system can 
be explained by balance sheet characteristics. The authors chose to keep the 
analysed banks anonymous and denote them bank 1 to bank 6, where 1, 2, 3 and 5 
are large commercial banks and 4 and 6 are considered medium sized banks. The 
first result implies the VaRs of the banks are positively correlated, indicating an 
underlying trend in VaRs. CoVaR estimations differ across banks, but bank 3 is 
perceived to contribute most to systemic risk, but is only ranked 4th in terms of 
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VaR. Likewise, bank 4, which has the most negative VaR, has smallest CoVaR. 
The authors conclude that significant (and varying) externalities may exist among 
banks and that this is something that has to be taken into consideration by 
regulators. The authors also analyse the correlation between size and systemic 
importance and find a coefficient of 0,26. The authors further investigate financial 
linkages between the banks in the sample by calculating firm-to-firm CoVaR and 
investigate possible explanatory characteristics that could explain the degree of 
financial linkage and spillover effects among the banks included. Size and interbank 
deposits are concluded to be two explanatory factors and asymmetries in ΔCoVaR 
are concluded to be present among the analysed banks. (Roengpitya and 
Rungcharoenkitkul (2011)). 
 
Previous research confirms that CoVaR analysis is of importance and serves as a 
helpful tool in examining risk spillover and systemic risk contribution of different 
entities. The CoVaR methodology is not tied to, for example, a specific asset class, 
but could easily be applied to, for example, countries, which makes it a useful tool 
with broad application possibilities. What previous research also confirms is 
evidence of the existence of a shock transmission channel between entities after 
having controlled for common shocks as represented by macro (state) variables. 
This shock transmission is also proven to be stronger in times of distress, than in 
good times, pointing to the fact that asymmetries exist.  There are many more 
studies on systemic risk contribution from a micro-evidential approach and again, 
the interested reader might find De Jonghe (2010), Segoviano and Goodhart (2009), 
Giglio (2010), López-Espinosa et al. (2012) or Lehar (2005) as interesting further 
reading suggestions.  
 
4 Theoretical framework  
 
4.1 What is systemic risk? 
A very short and simple definition of systemic risk refers to the risk of an entire 
financial system to collapse. It is connected to the disruption of a financial system, 
having major negative consequences for the real economy, caused by breakdowns in 
all or parts of the system, at the same time. (De Bandt and Hartmann (1998), BIS, 
(1994)) There is no completely unanimous definition of systemic risk, as different 
definitions emphasize different aspects. 
 
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) defines systemic risk as 
 “the risk that the failure of a participant to meet its contractual 
obligations may in turn cause other participants to default with a chain 
reaction leading to broader financial difficulties” (BIS (1994), 64th 
Annual Review, page 177) 
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Kaufman and Scott (2003) propose that 
“Systemic risk refers to the risk or probability of breakdowns in an 
entire system, as opposed to breakdowns in individual parts or 
components, and is evidenced by comovements (correlation) among 
most or all the parts” (Kaufman and Scott (2003), page 371) 
Rochet and Tirole (1997) refer systemic risk to 
“… the propagation of an agent’s economic distress to other agents 
linked to that agent through financial transactions” (Rochet and Tirole 
(1996),  page 733) 
According to Kaufman and Scott (2003) three frequently occurring concepts of 
systemic risk appear in the literature. The first concept concerns the incidence of a 
big macro shock having large and simultaneous effects on the entire, or parts, of 
the system, rather than just affecting one or a few institutions. The second and 
third concepts are related to micro-level perceptions concerning the shock 
transmission and spillover effects arising between different institutions. This idea of 
systemic risk is often translated to chain reactions and domino effects in the 
system.  (Kaufman and Scott (2003).  
4.2 Measuring risk 
Two of the most common risk measures in theory and practice are probably Value-
at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES), defined as follows 
 𝑉𝑎𝑅훼 𝐿 = min 𝑙:Pr(𝐿 > 𝑙) ≤ 1 − 𝛼  𝐸𝑆훼 𝐿 = 11 − 𝛼 𝑉𝑎𝑅푥 𝐿 𝑑𝑥1훼  
 
VaR is defined as the minimum loss l such that the probability of a future loss L 
larger than loss l, is less than or equal to 1 − 𝛼, or in case of a continuous loss 
distribution as 𝑃𝑟(L > VaR훼 (𝐿)) = 1 − 𝛼. ES is often characterised as measuring 
losses “beyond VaR” in the sense that it evaluates the tail of large losses and 
calculates the average of the losses greater than VaR. In case of a continuous loss 
distribution, ES can also be defined more intuitively as 𝐸 𝐿:𝐿 > 𝑉𝑎𝑅훼 (𝐿) . 
(Acerbi and Tasche (2002), JP Morgan (1996)). 
 
Both measures are used extensively in practice, not least VaR, which is used in 
financial regulation when considering minimal capital requirements of banks as well 
as by commercial and investment banks when considering potential losses of 
portfolios.  
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4.3 Measuring systemic risk 
VaR and ES normally take the approach of analysing the firm in isolation. Hence, 
they do not serve as proper risk measures when trying to quantify, for example, 
contribution to overall systemic risk, which is what is considered in this essay. Two 
measures that do are CoVaR and CoES, where CoVaR is the risk measure being 
considered in this essay and hence explained in more detail.  
 
CoVaR is a risk measure first proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier in 2011. It is 
defined as the VaR of an entity (e.g. firm, institution, country, portfolio) 
conditional on that another entity is in financial distress. Recalling that VaR (in 
terms of losses) of an entity is defined as  
 𝑉𝑎𝑅훼 𝐿 = min 𝑙:Pr(𝐿 > 𝑙)  ≤ 1 − 𝛼  
or more intuitively 𝑃𝑟 𝑋 ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑅푞 = 𝑞 
 
with X being the variable for which the VaR is defined (e.g. asset returns, CDS 
spreads; not necessarily losses), we can define CoVaR of entity j conditional on 
some event ℂ X!  of entity i in the following way 
 𝑃𝑟 𝑋푗 ≤ 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푞푗 ℂ 푋푖 ℂ 𝑋푖 = 𝑞 
Thus CoVaRqj i  is defined by the qth quantile of the conditional probability 
distribution above.  The event ℂ Xi , causing entity i to be in financial distress, is 
normally defined as that entity having reached it’s 1%-VaR level, i.e. Xi =VaRq=1%i , but, theoretically, it could be any negative event that is considered as 
being financially distressful. Further, an entity can be for example a single firm, 
many firms constituting a financial system, a country or another financial or non-
financial institution or asset. Accordingly CoVaR is the VaR of some entity j, 
conditional on another entity i being at it’s q %-VaR level. In terms of losses, 
CoVaR of entity j (with losses Y) conditional on entity i (with losses X) can be 
defined as 𝑃𝑟 𝐿푌 > 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푌 푋 𝐿푋 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅푋 = 1 − 𝛼 
 
CoVaR can also be used to analyse the risk contribution of one entity on another, 
or for example to analyse systemic risk contribution of a firm to a financial system 
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(or market), which is what is done in this essay. The interest lies in calculating ΔCoVaRqj i in the following way  
 𝛥𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푞푗 푖 = 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푞푗 푋푖=푉푎푅푞푖 − 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푞푗 푋푖=VaR푀푒푑푖푎푛푖  
 
Here, ΔCoVaR  is calculated as the 1% CoVaR (i.e the 1% VaR of entity j 
conditional on entity i being on its 1%-VaR level) minus the 50%-CoVaR (i.e the 
1% VaR of entity j conditional on entity i being in it’s median state, i.e. on it’s 50 
%-VaR level). Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) suggest calling ΔCoVaRqj i, where i 
is defined as being the financial system, as “exposure CoVaR” due to the fact that 
it measures the sensitivity of an individual institution towards systemic (system 
wide) financial events. The ΔCoVaRqj i measure is interesting because it can help 
identifying the most critical firms in terms of being most vulnerable during 
financial crises. (Adrian and Brunnermeier, (2011)) 
 
Like CoVaR’s similarity with VaR, we can now define CoESi as  
 𝐶𝑜𝐸𝑆훼,훽 𝑌 ,𝑋 = 11 − 𝛽 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푌 푋𝑑𝑡1훽  
defining Y and X as losses of entity Y (normally the financial system) and X (the 
firm within the chosen financial system) respectively, and α and β as significant 
levels (normally 1% or 5%) (Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011)).  
 
4.4 Related systemic risk measures 
Apart from CoVaR and CoES a number of other related systemic risk measures 
have evolved as a response to different shortcomings or modifications of the above-
mentioned measures.  
 
Huang, Zhou and Zhu (2010) adopt a systemic risk indicator that is measured by 
the price of insurance against systemic financial distress and assesses marginal 
system risk contributions of 19 bank holding companies. The systemic risk 
indicator is here defined as the insurance premium that protects against distressed 
losses of a hypothetical debt portfolio consisting of the total liabilities of all banks. 
The systemic risk, or also termed Distress Insurance Premium (DIP), of the 
banking system is then given by the risk-neutral expectation of the portfolio loss 
exceeding a certain threshold level.  
 𝐷𝐼𝑃 = 𝐸푄 𝐿 𝐿 ≥ 𝐿푚푖푛  
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Lmin denotes the minimum loss threshold and Li is denoted by the loss of bank i’s 
liability, with LiNi=1 = L being the total loss of the portfolio including all bank’s 
liabilities. Systemically important banks and marginal systemic risk contribution of 
each bank i, can now be obtained by the partial derivative of the DIP with respect 
to bank i 𝜕𝐷𝐼𝑃𝜕𝐿푖 ≡ 𝐸푄 𝐿푖 𝐿 ≥ 𝐿푚푖푛  
 
Another related systemic risk measure that has its origins in VaR and ES is 
Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES) and Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), as 
proposed by Acharya et al. (2010) in their paper named Measuring Systemic Risk. 
Without laying out detailed specifics, the authors propose a measure of systemic 
risk, systemic expected shortfall (SES), where each institution’s systemic risk 
contribution can be measured by its propensity to be undercapitalised when the 
system is undercapitalised, which is an increasing function of the firm’s volatility, 
leverage and tail-dependence. The authors suggest that institutions be “taxed” 
according to their SES in order to internalise the externality of their marginal 
contribution to systemic risk.  
 
Another risk measure, closely related to the DIP and the SES, is the Marginal 
Expected Shortfall (MES), also proposed by Acharya et al. (2010). The MES 
considers the expected loss of an entity conditional on the whole group of banks 
being under distress, i.e. it measures how entity i’s risk taking is affected by the 
risk taking of entity j.  
 𝑀𝐸𝑆푞푖 ≡ 𝐸(𝐿푖 𝐿 ≥ 𝑉𝑎𝑅푞) 
 
Compared with the DIP, the MES differs in the sense that the extreme condition is 
characterised by a percentile (i.e. q%-VaR), whereas the DIP focuses on a given 
threshold loss of the portfolio. (Acharya et al. (2010)) 
 
Another way of quantifying systemic risk is by using Shapley values. The actual 
origin and application of Shapley values is in game theory, published in A value for 
n-person games by Shapley (1952). The game theoretic Shapley value methodology 
is applied in cooperative games where a player’s Shapley value is his expected 
marginal contribution over all sets of combinations on the set of players in the 
game. As Cao (2013) explains, the methodology can be applied on the financial 
system where the Shapley value in that case is the systemic risk generated by the 
entities within the system. The idea of Shapley values is then to (efficiently) 
allocate total systemic risk to each institution in the system, according to the game 
theoretic solution concept. As the concept lies outside of the scope of this essay, I 
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encourage the interested reader to see Cao (2013), Tarashev, Borio and Tsatsaronis 
(2010) or, Shapley (1952) for the original work.  
 
Hansen (2013) further divides systemic risk measurements in four different groups; 
tail measures, contingent claims analysis, network models and dynamic stochastic 
macroeconomic models. Adrian and Brunnermeier’s CoVaR methodology can be 
found in the first group that focuses on co-dependence in the tails of equity returns. 
Contingent claims analysis is based on option pricing theory where the value of 
firm assets can be assumed to follow an underlying stochastic process where equity 
is a call option on firm assets, and debt is the corresponding put option. Network 
models, as mentioned in the section of previous research, focuses on the 
interconnectedness of institutions. Dynamic stochastic macroeconomic models try 
to connect financial market disruption with macroeconomic forces (Hansen (2013)). 
The literature on systemic risk measures is, as demonstrated, large and wide, 
depending on what perspective one wants to capture. For a comprehensive 
overview of literature that addresses systemic risk see DeBandt and Hartmann 
(2000) or Bisias et al. (2012).  
 
5 Methodology 
This essay takes a statistical and econometric approach in obtaining the results and 
drawing the conclusions. Specifically, the method of quantile regression (QR) 
(Koenker and Bassett (1978)) is applied to implement the CoVaR methodology of 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011).  QR is not the only means of estimation; a 
bivariate GARCH framework can also be used and will be demonstrated at the end 
of the methodology section.  
 
5.1 Quantile regression 
Quantile regression (QR), as first proposed by Koenker and Bassett (1978), is an 
econometric regression method that involves estimating the conditional median (or 
any quantile) of the variable in question, unlike OLS, which involves estimating the 
conditional mean. In this way QR is able to describe the relationship between 
variables at different points in the conditional distribution of the dependent 
variable.  
 
QR is used due to its straightforward and simple estimation procedure and it is 
also easily available in all statistical software packages. Generally, QR is based on 
minimising the sum of residuals in absolute value, where the residuals are weighted 
asymmetrically through the quantile, depending on if they are positive or negative. 
As opposed to OLS, QR models the relationship between the independent 
variable(s) and the conditional quantiles of the dependent variable. The advantages 
of QR over OLS are that QR is more robust to outliers and non-normal residuals 
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than OLS, and it is also invariant to monotonic transformations, unlike the mean 
in OLS. (Brian and Noon, (2003)) 
 
Consider the following simple model that can be used to describe the method 
underlying QR 𝑦푖 = 𝑥푖′𝛽푞 + 𝑢푖 
 
where 𝛽푞 is the vector of unknown parameters associated with a particular quantile 
q, y is a vector of dependent variables, x is a vector of independent variables and u 
is a vector of residuals. Following the logic in OLS, the sum of residuals is 
minimised but unlike OLS, the residuals are not squared in a QR. The following 
optimisation problem is formed 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛훽 𝜌푞 𝑢푖  푁푖 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛훽 𝜌푞 𝑦푖 − 𝑥푖′𝛽푞N푖  
 
where 𝜌푞 𝑢푖  is a weighting function for quantile 𝑞 given by.  𝑢(𝑞 − 1(𝑢 < 0 )). 
The weights are determined depending on if the residuals are positive or negative 
and can be interpreted as asymmetric penalties. A weight of 1-q is given to 
negative residuals, i.e. if the fitted value underestimates the observed value, and a 
weight of q is given to positive residuals, i.e. if the fitted value overestimates the 
observed value. Taking above information into consideration, the objective function 
takes the following, expanded, form 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛훽 𝑄 𝛽푞  
where 𝑄 𝛽푞 = 𝑞 𝑦푖 − 𝑥푖′𝛽푞푁푖=푦푖≥푥푖′훽푞 + (1 − 𝑞) 𝑦푖 − 𝑥푖′𝛽푞푁푖=푦푖≤푥푖′훽푞  
 
Note that this solution will yield different values of the coefficient estimate β  depending on what quantile q is chosen. In this way, QR is implemented by 
forming an optimisation problem. The QR estimator will be asymptotically 
normally distributed even though it does not require any initial distributional 
assumptions about the residuals. (Koenker and Hallock, (2001)). 
 
In regular order, marginal effects are obtained by taking the derivative of the 
conditional quantile function with respect to the parameter of interest j.  
 𝜕𝑄푞 𝑦푖 𝑥푖𝜕𝑥푗 = 𝛽푞푗 
where 
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𝑄푞 𝑦푖 𝑥푖 = 𝑥푖′𝛽푞  
The interpretation of a quantile regression parameter 𝛽푞푗 should now be clear. 𝛽푞푗 
estimates the change in a quantile q of the dependent variable, generated by a one-
unit change in the independent variable. This technically summarises what the 
CoVaR methodology is about and, hopefully, complements the practical 
explanations demonstrated in the previous section. 
 
5.2 Estimation of VaR, CoVaR and ΔCoVaR 
As previously mentioned, CoVaR and ΔCoVaR can be estimated under a 
conditional or unconditional framework. The unconditional framework yields 
measures of VaR, CoVaR and ΔCoVaR that are constant over time and it does 
not control for economy wide shocks that have an impact on the firms. It gives a 
static approach to systemic risk at a given point of time based on historical 
movements of stock returns only. The conditional approach for estimating the 
abovementioned risk measures tries to “refine” CoVaR by controlling for the 
abovementioned economy wide shocks in order to explain how firms’ (extreme) 
returns affect other firms’ (extreme) returns. In other words, the goal is to focus on 
idiosyncratic risk, rather than idiosyncratic and systematic risks together.  
Economy wide shocks are represented by several macro variables, which are 
included in the estimation procedure, and which are assumed to explain asset 
returns. These could be indicators of, for example, investor sentiment or the 
business cycle or simply returns of other markets. Conditional estimation of CoVaR 
can therefore be referred to as a dynamic approach, unlike the unconditional 
estimation approach which in a similar manner could be called a static approach.  
 
To avoid confusion; the term CoVaR always includes two entities of some form. In 
this essay, when referring to CoVaR, these two entities are either the Nordic 
system (OMX Nordic 40=OMX) and some firm’s stock i, or the Nordic system (1) 
and the European system (2), (EuroStoxx50=ES), if not otherwise stated. These 
are referred to as CoVaROMX i and CoVaROMX ES respectively, or only CoVaR if 
the information applies to both expressions.  
 
5.2.1 Unconditional estimation of VaR, CoVaR and ΔCoVaR 
CoVaR can be easily estimated using statistical software that applies the 
previously described technique of QR. To obtain 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅OMX 푖, in the way we earlier 
defined it, we first have to obtain 1% and 50%-VaR of stock i, for i=1,2,…,37, 
which we do by simple historical simulation. Remembering the definition of VaR; 
since 𝑉𝑎𝑅푞푖  is the quantile q of the returns of firm’s stock i, we run a QR of firm i’s 
returns on a constant only, with q=1% and q=50% for median state VaR: 
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𝑋푞푖 = 𝛼푞푖 + 𝜀푞푖   (1) 
 𝑉𝑎𝑅푞푖 = 𝛼푞푖   (2) 
Similarly for the system,  
 𝑋푞푠푦푠푡푒푚 = 𝛼푞푠푦푠푡푒푚 + 𝜀푞푠푦푠푡푒푚 (3) 
 𝑉𝑎𝑅푞푠푦푠푡푒푚 = 𝛼푞푠푦푠푡푒푚  (4) 
 
To obtain the actual 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푂푀푋 푖, which we define as the 1% VaR of the system 
conditional on that a firm i is on its 1% VaR level, we (quantile) regress the 
system’s returns on a constant and the returns of firm i: 
 𝑋푞푂푀푋,푖 = 𝛼푞푖 + 𝛽푞푖𝑋푖 + 𝜀푞푖   (5) 
 
We obtain the coefficients of 𝛼 and 𝛽 from the above regression, and use them 
together with the obtained 𝑉𝑎𝑅푞푖  (equation 2) and construct 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푂푀푋 푖 
 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푞푂푀푋 푋푖=푉푎푅푞푖 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅푞푂푀푋 𝑉𝑎𝑅푞푖 = 𝛼푞푖 + 𝛽푞푖𝑉𝑎𝑅푞푖 (6) 
 
and further construct ΔCoVaR 
 ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푞=1%푂푀푋 푖 = 𝛽푞=1%푖 𝑉𝑎𝑅푞=1%푖 − 𝑉𝑎𝑅푞=50%푖   (7) 
 
Similarly, to obtain 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅OMX ES , i.e the VaR of the Nordic OMX system 
conditional on the Eurostoxx50 (European market) being in financial distress and 
vice versa, we perform the same QR, but instead of regressing on firms’ returns, we 
regress on the index (system) returns and use the estimated system VaRs to 
construct 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅OMX ES. 
 𝑋푞푂푀푋,퐸푆 = 𝛼푞퐸푆 + 𝛽푞퐸푆𝑋퐸푆 + 𝜀푞퐸푆  (8) 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푞푂푀푋 푋퐸푆=푉푎푅푞퐸S = 𝑉𝑎𝑅푞푂푀푋 𝑉𝑎𝑅푞퐸푆 = 𝛼푞퐸푆 + 𝛽푞퐸푆𝑉𝑎𝑅푞퐸푆         (9) 
 𝑋푞퐸푆,푂푀푋 = 𝛼푞푂푀푋 + 𝛽푞푂푀푋𝑋푂푀푋 + 𝜀푞푂푀푋 (10) 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푞퐸푆 푋푂푀푋=푉푎푅푞푂푀푋 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅푞퐸푆 𝑉𝑎𝑅푞푂푀푋 = 𝛼푞푂푀푋 + 𝛽푞푂푀푋𝑉𝑎𝑅푞푂푀푋      (11) 
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Finally, ΔCoVaR, i.e. how much the Nordic stock system contributes to European 
systemic risk and vice versa, is obtained by 
 ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푞=1%푂푀푋 퐸푆 = 𝛽푞=1%퐸푆 𝑉𝑎𝑅푞=1%퐸푆 − 𝑉𝑎𝑅푞=50%퐸푆   (12) 
and ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푞=1%퐸푆 푂푀푋 = 𝛽푞=1%푂푀푋 𝑉𝑎𝑅푞=1%푂푀푋 − 𝑉𝑎𝑅푞=50%푂푀푋   (13) 
 
As specified in the above equations, regressions are run on all firms as well as for 
the two indices for quantiles 1% and 50%.  
 
The regressions enable a construction of each firm’s (static) systemic risk 
contribution to the Nordic stock market as proxied by the OMXNordic40 index, as 
well as the Nordic market’s systemic risk contribution to European systemic risk, 
as proxied by the EuroStoxx50 index.  
 
5.2.2 Conditional estimation of VaR, CoVaR and ΔCoVaR 
In order to get a more refined estimation of CoVaR, the above estimation can also 
be applied including additional macro variables other than only stock returns, as 
accomplished above. These variables can represent, for example, the business cycle, 
investor sentiment or time variation of assets returns, or any other variables that 
are presumed to explain and affect stock returns. These variables should be 
interpreted as conditioning variables that intend to control for non-idiosyncratic, 
i.e. market specific, risks. The chosen macro variables will be motivated and 
presented in the data section that follows this part.  
 
The following QR is run on a firm’s stock’s daily returns for quantile q=1% and 
q=50% for i=1,2…37. This to obtain time varying 1%-VaR and 50%-VaR series, 
conditioned on macro variables included in the vector M.  
 𝑋푡푖 𝑞 = 𝛼푞푖 + 𝛽푞푖𝑀푡 + 𝜀푡푖 (14) 
 
With estimates of 𝛼 and 𝛽 parameters we can now form a conditional VaR series of 
firm (stock) i 𝑉𝑎𝑅푡푖 𝑞 = 𝛼푞푖 + 𝛽푞푖𝑀푡  (15) 
 
For the system specific return, i.e. OMX Nordic 40 and EuroStoxx50 in this essay, 
we follow the same logic to obtain a time varying system VaR series 
 𝑋푡푠푦푠 𝑞 = 𝛼푞푠푦푠 + 𝛽푞푠푦푠𝑀푡 + 𝜀푡푠푦푠  (16) 
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𝑉𝑎𝑅푡푠푦푠 𝑞 = 𝛼푞푠y푠 + 𝛽푞푠푦푠𝑀푡   (17) 
 
where sys denotes the OMX Nordic 40 index and EuroStoxx50 Index as before. 
 
For the estimation of CoVaR and ΔCoVaR we run the following regressions, also 
for q=1% and q=50% 
 𝑋푡푠푦푠 푖 𝑞 = 𝛼푞푠푦푠 푖 + 𝛽푞,1푠푦푠 푖𝑋푡푖 + 𝛽푞,2푠푦푠 푖𝑀푡 + 𝜀푡푠푦푠 푖 (18) 
 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푡푖 𝑞 = 𝛼0푠푦푠 푖 + 𝛽푞,1푠푦푠 푖𝑉𝑎𝑅푡푖 𝑞 + 𝛽푞,2푠푦푠 푖𝑀푡 (19) 
 
where 𝑋푡푖 are the returns of firm i. We finally calculate each firm’s systemic risk 
contribution (ΔCoVaR) to the Nordic market (equation 20), as well as the Nordic 
market’s marginal contribution to European systemic risk (equation 21) as follows 
 ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푡푖 𝑞 = 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푡푖 𝑞 − 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푡푖 𝑞 = 50%   (20) ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푡푠y푠 𝑞 = 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푡푠푦푠 𝑞 − 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푡푠푦푠 𝑞 = 50%  (21) 
 
This way of estimating CoVaROMX i and CoVaROMX ES  is denoted time varying 
conditional CoVaR by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). It takes into account the 
time varying nature of risk and conditions VaR on information available at time t, 
explaining the fact why we now have an index t in the equations as opposed to 
unconditional CoVaR estimation, which is a constant-over-time-approach.  
 
5.2.3 CoVaR using GARCH models 
The parameter estimates necessary for calculating CoVaR can also be solved by 
estimating a bivariate diagonal vech GARCH(1,1) model for each institution. 
Technically and practically harder, this method allows obtaining the time-varying 
covariance between institutions and the system through a Gaussian framework 
where CoVaR has a closed form expression. As part of robustness checks, Adrian 
and Brunnermeier (2011) performed their estimations using a bivariate GARCH 
framework and found that the results, as opposed to estimation with QR, did not 
differ significantly. Also, estimation with GARCH requires strong distributional 
assumptions that practically can be ignored using QR. With this in mind and 
following the rule of thumb of model parsimony, QR is concluded sufficient in 
estimating CoVaR in a, relatively, reliable way and serves as a motivation for why 
this technique was chosen also in this essay.  
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6 Data 
The data used in this essay consists of macro and stock market data, all publicly 
available in either Datastream or on the Nasdaq OMX website. The stock market 
data constitutes the bulk of the data used in this essay. Daily adjusted closing 
prices of 36 firms’ stocks, as listed on the OMX Nordic 40 index, as well as the 
index itself, representing the Nordic financial system, are collected for the period 
January 1st 2002 to March 31st 2014. All 40 stocks in the index are unfortunately 
not used due to missing data during the entire time period. The EuroStoxx50 
index, representing the European stock market, is also collected during the same 
time period. Firm and index data is transformed according to 
 𝑃푖,푡+1 − 𝑃푖,푡𝑃푖,푡 = 𝑋푖,푡 
 
which yields the returns in per cent of the abovementioned data. Percentage 
returns are used due to their convenience, and due to prices being nominated in 
three different currencies. In this way, we are able to obtain a unit free measure of 
returns. Stock market data was chosen in this essay for the simple reason that it 
reflects many different types of risk that build up overall systemic risk. As we have 
seen, CDS data can, with advantage, also be used but it mainly captures credit risk 
and might be useful when considering for example credit risk linkages specifically. 
 
The firms listed on the OMX Nordic 40 Index can be found in appendix 1 and 
below is a specification of the represented sectors: 
 
Table 1 Specification of sectors represented in the OMX Nordic 40 Index (as of 2014.03) 
  Sector # 
1 Transportation/shipping 1 
2 Manufacturing 8 
3 Health care 5 
4 Automotive 2 
5 Consumer products 5 
6 Financials 7 
7 Telecommunications 4 
8 Utility 1 
9 Construction 1 
10 Forestry 2 
 
When it comes to choosing what macro variables to include in the estimation of 
conditional CoVaR, one has to take into consideration what factors might affect 
the stock returns of Nordic firms. Even though each firm reacts to these 
macroeconomic factors differently, it makes sense to choose variables that the firms 
might have in common. With reference to Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), and 
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also Chan-Lau (2008) the following macro variables were chosen to be included in 
the conditional CoVaR estimations in this essay 
 
1. Volatility of the Eurostoxx50 Index  
2. Returns on the S&P500 index 
3. Euribor 3 month interest rate 
 
The three chosen variables represent investor sentiment, trend and expectations, 
and a business cycle indicator, respectively. The volatility of the Eurostoxx50 index 
is expected to have a negative impact on CoVaR and ΔCoVaR, returns on S&P500 
index are expected to have a positive impact and the change in the 3month Euribor 
interest rate can both have a negative and positive impact on the firm, depending 
on what industry the firm in question is in. To avoid problems of non-stationary 
data, the variables are expressed in first differences and further modified in the 
same way as the stock data.   
 
7 Empirical results 
To get a simple overview of the results, and for practical and space related 
purposes, all results are sector specific and will be presented in averages and semi-
annual averages of the daily estimates, if not otherwise stated. Firm specific results 
and estimations can be found in Appendix 2. Sector specific results are constructed 
by taking the average of the firms included in the specific sector, as presented in 
the data section. To avoid confusion, the results will be structured as follows; first, 
descriptive statistics of the return and macro variables data will be presented. 
Second, unconditional estimation of VaR, CoVaR and ΔCoVaR will be presented. 
Since estimations are unconditional, these measures are constant over time and can 
be seen as snapshots of today based on returns information contained in the period 
2002-2014. Third, conditional VaR, CoVaR and ΔCoVaR estimations will be 
shown and discussed. The conditional estimations will be time varying and hence 
allow us to explore the abovementioned risk measures from a time perspective. The 
section closes with a comparison of the two and then a summarising conclusion of 
the overall results.   
 
7.1 Summary statistics  
As mentioned in the data section, daily closing stock prices of 37 stocks included in 
the OMX Nordic 40 index are used in this essay during the period January 2002 to 
March 2014. To avoid problems of non-stationarity, the data was made stationary 
by first differencing closing prices and obtaining time series expressed in returns. A 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root was performed to confirm stationarity (see 
Appendix 5 for statistics). The following table summarises descriptive data 
characteristics of sector specific returns according to the sector specification 
presented before. Firm specific summary statistics can be found in Appendix 3. 
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Table 2 Summary statistics of sector returns (2002.01-2014.03) 
 
Daily average return is largest for the Manufacturing sector with 0,073% and 
smallest for the EuroStoxx50 index, as well as Telecommunications and Forestry 
sectors. Another way of expressing risk is by calculating the volatility, as measured 
by the standard deviation, of returns. We observe that the Manufacturing and 
Telecommunications industry present highest volatility with 2,36 % and 2,37 % 
respectively. Telecommunications and Transportation sectors show the highest 
observed return during the time period and Telecommunications also shows the 
lowest observed return. 
 
Observing the kurtosis and skewness of the returns data, it is quite obvious that 
returns are not normally distributed (a normally distributed variable should 
optimally exhibit kurtosis of 3 and skewness of 0). A Jarque-Bera test for normality 
was also performed to confirm the numerical results (see Appendix 4 for statistics). 
VaR, CoVaR and ΔCoVaR estimation using the bivariate GARCH technique, 
mentioned in the estimation section, would consequently not work well as a proper 
estimation method. The t-distribution with a scale parameter would be a better fit 
in case one wants to estimate VaR, CoVaR and ΔCoVaR using GARCH models. 
Another approach when dealing with heavy tailed returns is to use extreme value 
theory.  
 
The EuroStoxx50 volatility index, S&P500 closing prices as well as the 3 month 
Euribor interest rate were used as macro variables in the conditional estimations of 
VaR, CoVaR and ΔCoVaR, with descriptive statistics in table 3. To avoid 
problems with non-stationary data, the three variables were made stationary by 
taking first differences. Stationarity is confirmed by a Dickey-Fuller test for unit 
root, with results presented in Appendix 5.  
 
 
Mean St. Dev Max Min Kurtosis Skewness 
Transportation 0,0005223 0,0214158 0,2632462 -0,1299304 11,4520187 0,7966252 
Manufacturing 0,0007297 0,0236466 0,1919638 -0,1648135 6,0878498 0,2877235 
Health care 0,0006575 0,0177065 0,1441611 -0,1732980 9,5742275 -0,1285566 
Automotive 0,0006183 0,0204000 0,2263155 -0,1375964 11,5062478 0,7262372 
Consumer products 0,0004443 0,0185930 0,1453922 -0,1374255 6,6813510 0,1990678 
Financials 0,0004892 0,0215071 0,1711019 -0,1560362 7,6671372 0,2384631 
Telecommunications 0,0000898 0,0236687 0,2426828 -0,2684559 11,1101745 -1,4760878 
Utility 0,0006421 0,0179508 0,1460123 -0,1138107 6,5861114 0,1726621 
Construction 0,0004392 0,0194579 0,1688312 -0,1267606 5,8886116 0,3744094 
Forestry 0,0000841 0,0221167 0,1385875 -0,1037535 3,2291113 0,2312438 
OMXN40 0,0002077 0,0154812 0,0982941 -0,0834942 4,1374863 0,1259259 
EUROSTOXX50 0,0000582 0,0152616 0,1100183 -0,0788006 5,3449288 0,2054471 
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Table 3 Summary statistics of macro variables (2002.01-2014.03) 
 
Mean St. Dev Max Min Kurtosis Skewness 
EuroStoxx Volatility 0,0014986 0,0581252 0,3877376 -0,2205645 4,3838966 1,1572175 
S&P500 return 0,0002340 0,0127164 0,1158004 -0,0903498 9,7401497 0,0077316 
3 month Euribor -0,0007131 0,0068115 0,0582878 -0,1435257 70,5160008 -2,8269315 
 
 
7.2 Unconditional estimates of systemic risk contribution  
To get a first overview of firms’ riskiness in terms of VaR, we present the 
unconditional daily 1%-VaR of the Nordic stock market and the European stock 
market, as proxied by the OMX Nordic 40 index and the EuroStoxx50 index 
respectively, together with sector specific estimates. To facilitate graphical 
representation, firm specific tables are found in Appendix 6.  
 
Figure 1 Unconditional sector 1%-VaR (2002.01-2014.03) 
 
 
As presented in the methodology section, VaR was constructed using the estimated 
coefficients from the QR (see Appendix 2 for list of coefficient estimates). Since the 
VaR estimations are based on daily returns, all 50%-VaR estimation were zero 
(apart from OMXN40 50%-VaR which was 0,00033)which is why 50%-VaR 
estimates are not presented in the unconditional results. 
 
Studying figure 1 above, we can conclude that Telecommunications, Forestry and 
Manufacturing are the three sectors that have highest (in absolute value) day 1%-
VaR. Health care, Consumer products and Construction are found to have the 
lowest corresponding VaR. For intuition, a 1%-VaR of -0,04563 of the Health care 
sector means that this sector, or a portfolio consisting of firms in this sector, will 
not lose more than 4,563 % during a day with 99% certainty.  
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The sector(s) with highest VaRs are of course the most interesting to examine in 
terms of risk management purposes. Telecommunications was the sector with 
highest volatility of returns, as measured by its standard deviation. Not 
surprisingly, risk, as measured by volatility of returns, is positively correlated with 
risk as measured by VaR, as we can see from the descriptive statistics.  
 
In figure 2 below we present 1%-VaR together with 1%-CoVaR. As explained in 
the methodology section, unconditional CoVaR is estimated by running a QR 
involving two variables; in this case, system (OMX Nordic 40) returns as 
dependent variable, regressed on a constant and the returns of the firm (or sector). 
For all 10 sectors, as well as for the European system, the above regression was 
performed - i.e. in figure 2, the names on the right hand side represent the 
independent variables in the regressions. Only for CoVaR of EUROSTOXX50, 
OMXN40 served as the independent variable.  
 
Figure 2 Unconditional sector 1%-VaR and 1%-CoVaR (2002.01-2014.03) 
 
For intuition, CoVaR is the VaR of the Nordic system conditional on a sector 
being in distress (i.e. on its 1%-VaR level). Hence, it is the maximum loss incurred 
by the Nordic market (as proxied by the index) when a sector is found to be on it’s 
1%-VaR level, on a daily basis and with 99% certainty. For example, when the 
sector Health care is on its 1%-VaR level, then the 1%-VaR of the Nordic stock 
market is -0,05024. 
 
What is interesting in this figure is that we can compare the Nordic stock market’s 
VaR conditional on a sector’s and European stock market’s 1%-VaR. This is a way 
of identifying spillover effects on the Nordic stock market arising from different 
sectors on this market. Observing only 1%-CoVaR in isolation, we can identify 
what sectors have highest spillover effects on the Nordic stock market. Since this is 
not the aim of the essay, but a step necessary calculating ΔCoVaR, we only 
consider these results briefly.  
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Looking at the 1%-CoVaR spikes in isolation, the largest spillover effects to the 
Nordic stock market seem to arise from the European stock market and 
Construction and Financials sectors. However, Utility, Consumer products, Health 
care and Automotive sectors also have spillover effects onto the Nordic market that 
are larger than their risk seen in isolation. What is further interesting is that those 
sectors having largest individual VaRs are at the same time characterised by 
having lowest CoVaRs. So, even though a sector experiences a large VaR, which is 
a bad thing, this risk does not seem to spill over to the same extent, which is a 
good thing. To summarise, as opposed to a sector’s risk in isolation, as measured 
by 1%-VaR, the 1%-CoVaR risk measure is larger than 1%-VaR in 6 out of 10 
sectors. This indicates that interconnectedness and linkages do have a role.  
 
Figure 3 below illustrates each sector’s marginal risk contribution to overall 
systemic risk of the Nordic stock market. As before, the names on the right-hand 
side indicate the independent variable of a quantile regression where Nordic system 
returns is the dependent variable (or the European system in the case of 
OMXN40). To recapitulate, marginal systemic risk contribution, as measured by 
ΔCoVaR, was calculated as the difference between 1%-CoVaR and 50%-CoVaR.  
 
Figure 3 Unconditional sector ΔCoVaR (2002.01-2014.03) 
 
 
Unconditional ΔCoVaR appears to be the largest for the EuroStoxx50 variable. In 
practice, this means, not unexpectedly, that the European stock market contributes 
the most to over all systemic risk on the Nordic stock market. Taking a closer look 
at which particular sectors in the Nordic stock market that contribute most to 
Nordic stock market systemic risk, we find Construction, Financials and 
Automotive sectors. The sectors contributing the least are Forestry, Health care 
and Transportation.  For intuition, ΔCoVaR measures how much an institution’s 
transition, from being at median state (at 50%-VaR) and then going into financial 
distress (1%-VaR), contributes to the VaR of the Nordic stock market. 
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Figure 4 below illustrates unconditional 1%-VaR and ΔCoVaR, i.e. we can observe 
the riskiness of a firm in isolation versus its marginal contribution to overall 
systemic risk.  
 
Figure 4 Unconditional sector 1%-VaR and ΔCoVaR (2002.01-2014.03) 
 
As previous research show, we observe that ΔCoVaR is larger (in absolute value) 
than 1%-VaR in the majority of cases, and sectors having a large VaR generally 
seem to have a large ΔCoVaR. In three cases; Forestry, Telecommunications and 
Manufacturing, we can observe a 1%-VaR that is larger than their corresponding 
ΔCoVaR.  
 
Referring to previous research, one of the main conclusions drawn was that VaR is 
probably not sufficient when it comes to measuring and managing risk. This is also 
confirmed here – in the majority of cases, spillover effects as measured by CoVaR, 
are larger than risk as measured by VaR.  Another conclusion in disfavour of VaR 
is the fact that ΔCoVaR, in 3 out of 10 sectors, was measured as being larger than 
1% VaR. This is a serious problem; when a firm’s risk in isolation is smaller than 
the contribution that firm has to overall systemic risk. It confirms the importance 
of monitoring interconnectedness and financial linkages between firms and sectors, 
rather than looking at, and basing regulating on, firm risk in isolation.  
 
7.3 Conditional estimates of systemic risk contribution 
As mentioned in the methodology section, conditional estimation of VaR, CoVaR 
and ΔCoVaR allows us to examine how mentioned risk measures evolve over time. 
We include additional variables in the estimations that are assumed to explain 
stock returns and that can be assumed to capture the time varying nature of risk. 
The inclusion of macro variables also allows us to produce estimates that are more 
refined relative to the unconditional constant measures that only give us a single 
output.  
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We begin by examining the conditional average 1% -VaR for the 10 sectors and 
two market indices, as illustrated in figure 5 below.  
 
Figure 5 Conditional average sector 1%-VaR (2002.01-2014.03) 
 
 
In accordance with our unconditional measures of VaR; Forestry, Manufacturing 
and Telecommunications are the three sectors having the, on average, highest (in 
absolute value) individual risk as measure by 1% VaR.  
 
To capture the evolution of 1%-VaR series during the period 2002-2014 we plot 
thirteen averages that represent VaR on a semi annual basis, i.e. two times per 
year (July and December) each year during 2002-2013 and until 31st of March 2014. 
In the figure we can track the evolution of VaR during different time periods, 
including for example the financial crisis.  
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As figure 6 shows, the pattern over time is similar over different sectors and we get 
a clear distinction of what sectors had highest VaRs and when. As expected, we 
have drops in VaR in 2008-2 and 2012-2. The first drop refers to the global 
financial crisis, and the second drop most likely refers to the (ongoing) Eurozone 
crisis. We observe the EuroStoxx50 Index having the smallest average VaR (in 
absolute value) during the time period and we find Telecommunications and 
Forestry sectors having largest VaRs. 
 
Continuing to the conditional CoVaR estimations, 1% and 50%-CoVaR figures are 
presented below. As mentioned before, figures 9 and 10 present the semi annual 
Figure 6 Conditional semi annual average sector 1%-VaR (2002.01-2014.03) 
	   32 
evolution of VaR of the Nordic stock market (as proxied by the OMX Nordic 40 
index) conditional on each sector being at its 1% and 50%-VaR level. Figures 7 and 
8 present total averages in order to get a snapshot estimate of the conditional 
CoVaR. 
 
Figure 7 Conditional average sector 1%-CoVaR (2002.01-2014.03) 
 
 
Figure 8 Conditional average sector 50 %-CoVaR (2002.01-2014.03) 
 
 
The three sectors impacting the 1%-VaR of the Nordic stock market are Forestry, 
Construction and the EuroStoxx50 index. Apart from Forestry, the other two 
sectors were not among those having largest 1%-VaR. Observing the 50%-CoVaR 
averages, Consumer products and Health care are the two sectors having an impact 
on the Nordic system 1% VaR during median state.  Below we plot semi annual 
estimates of CoVaR in order to get a time-varying illustration. Recapitulating the 
intuition of CoVaR; a 1% CoVaR of for example Utility, at -0,04, means that the 
Utility sector, being at it’s 1%-VaR level, affects the VaR of the Nordic system by 
-0,04, i.e. -4%. In the same fashion, 50% CoVaR of the Consumer products sector 
of -0,00130 means that this sector, being in its median state, affects the VaR of the 
Nordic system by -0,130%.  
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Figure 9  Conditional semi annual average sector 1%-CoVaR; system VaR conditional on sector i 
being at its 1%-VaR, and macro variables (2002.01-2014.03) 
	   34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Again, we observe two drops; one in 2008 and one in 2012, related to the previously 
mentioned financial events.  From these illustrations we can also conclude that 
sectors usually affect the Nordic system in a similar way; the graphs rarely cross 
and all sectors follows a similar pattern over time. What also can be observed is 
that there is more uncertainty in how firms affect the overall market when they are 
at their 50% VaR level, than when they are in financial distress.  
 
Having presented the conditional VaR and CoVaR estimates, ΔCoVaR will now be 
illustrated in the same fashion. For an intuitive overview of what sectors contribute 
Figure 10	  	  Conditional semi annual average sector 50%-CoVaR; system VaR conditional on sector i 
being at its 1%-VaR, and macro variables (2002.01-2014.03) 
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the most to the Nordic stock market, conditional average sector ΔCoVaR estimates 
are presented in figure 11 below.  
 
Figure 11 Conditional average sector ΔCoVaR (2002.01-2014.03) 
 
 
For intuitive purposes, the meaning of ΔCoVaR is that it shows how much the 
VaR of the Nordic system is affected when a sector goes from being in median state 
into financial distress, i.e. going from being at its 50%-VaR level to its 1%-VaR-
level. The sectors contributing the most to Nordic stock market systemic risk on 
average, as measured by ΔCoVaR, are Forestry, Construction and the 
EuroStoxx50 index (or more intuitively the European stock market). We find the 
Consumer products, Automotive and Health care among the sectors contributing 
least. Taking semi-annual averages during the examined period, we obtain a 
(shorter) time-varying series of ΔCoVaR of the different sectors and indices. Again 
here, we observe a drop in 2008 and 2012, however the latter is more pronounced 
from a ΔCoVaR perspective, where systemic risk contribution was largest during 
this time of financial distress.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0,05	
 -0,045	
 -0,04	
 -0,035	
 -0,03	
 -0,025	
 -0,02	
 -0,015	
 -0,01	
 -0,005	
 0	

Transportation/shipping 
Manufacturing 
Health care 
Automotive 
Consumer products 
Financials 
Telecommunications 
Utility 
Construction 
Forestry 
OMXN40 
EUROSTOXX50 
	   36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unlike VaR, CoVaR and ΔCoVaR measure risk conditional on another entity i 
being in financial distress. It is therefore important to compare 1%VaR estimates 
with ΔCoVaR estimates in order to examine not only the entity in isolation but 
the entity in connection to other entities, as we have seen these two can differ. As 
we have observed in the conditional VaR, CoVaR and ΔCoVaR estimations, as 
well as in previous research, VaR was not regarded presenting a sufficient estimate 
of risk due to the interconnectedness of entities.  In figure 9 below, we observe 
averages of sector 1% VaR and sector ΔCoVaR. 
 
Figure 12 Conditional semi annual average sector ΔCoVaR; how much a sector i contributed to 
system VaR by going from its 50%-VaR to its 1%-VaR (2002.01-2014.03) 
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Figure 13 Conditional average sector 1%-VaR and ΔCoVaR (2002.01-2014.03) 
 
We observe that 1%-VaR is larger in all 10 sectors, i.e. the risk of a sector in 
isolation is larger than the risk that it contributes with to the Nordic stock market. 
For intuition, the ΔCoVaR measures the change, in per cent, of the Nordic stock 
market’s 1%-VaR when a sector i is moving from its 50%-VaR to its 1%-VaR. For 
example, the ΔCoVaR reported by the Forestry industry is -0,0429; this means 
that the 1%-VaR of the OMX Nordic 40 is affected by 4,29 % when the VaR of the 
Forestry sector moves from being at its 50%-VaR level into financial distress, i.e. 
1%-VaR.  
 
Further, confirming previous research, a (visible) positive relationship between 1%-
VaR and ΔCoVaR is not found in this essay as the plot of figure 10 below 
suggests. 
 
Figure 14 Plot of conditional average sector 1%-VaR on horizontal axis and  ΔCoVaR on vertical axis 
(2002.01-2014.03)  
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The results of the conditional estimations also support findings from previous 
research. The first concerns the finding that there seems not to be any (positive) 
relationship between 1%-VaR and ΔCoVaR; i.e. a high entity VaR does not 
necessarily translate into a high ΔCoVaR. The results also imply that ΔCoVaR is 
higher during distress periods than during times of financial prosperity.  The 
sectors contributing the most to Nordic systemic risk are Forestry, Construction 
and Telecommunications sectors. No sectors show a higher ΔCoVaR than their 
corresponding stand-alone 1%-VaR, which is positive. Although, considering 
EuroStoxx50 impact on Nordic systemic risk, we find a ΔCoVaR that is almost 
twice as large as its stand-alone risk measured by 1%-VaR. 
 
In comparison to the unconditional ΔCoVaR estimates, where in some cases 1%-
VaR was larger than ΔCoVaR, all ΔCoVaR estimates in the conditional 
estimations were below their respective 1% VaR estimates. Since the conditional 
estimation differs from the unconditional only by the additional included macro 
variables, it is reasonable to conclude that the difference is due to the inclusion if 
these variables. As previously mentioned, the inclusion of additional explanatory 
variables in the VaR and CoVaR estimations yields estimates that control for these 
variables, i.e. we can distinguish the effect the variables might have on the 
estimates of VaR, CoVaR and ΔCoVaR.   
 
The analysis performed in this essay is a system-to-entity analysis. One could easily 
obtain entity-to-entity estimates (i.e how a given sector’s (or even firm’s) 1%-VaR 
changes when another sector (or firm) realises it’s 1%-VaR level) by implementing 
the same techniques; this will be illustrated in a case study by using banks on the 
OMX Nordic 40 index, in the section that follows. Another possibility is to examine 
how an entity, or system, reacts when several sectors reach their 1% VaR levels, at 
the same time.  
 
8 Case study: Risk linkages of Nordic banks  
In addition to analysing firms on the Nordic market, it is important to analyse 
banks in particular, on this market. Nordic firms most likely rely on credit from 
Nordic banks, and Nordic banks most likely have these Nordic firms as their 
customers. Given this connection of banks to, essentially, the whole Nordic 
economy makes them important in terms of their systemic position towards other 
banks. Contagion and spillover effects are considered most prevalent in the 
financial system because of these interconnections. It is therefore of specific 
importance to measure how risk of one bank affects the risk of another bank, in 
addition to examining how much these banks contribute to overall systemic risk, 
which we considered in the previous section.   
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This short case study serves as a complement to this essay and demonstrates an 
entity-to-entity analysis with help of ΔCoVaR. Interpretation is not different than 
before, only in this case we are able to narrow down the analysis and examine a 
sector that is important to all other sectors examined in this essay. The same 
methodology and estimation technique is used as before, however only conditional 
estimations of VaR, CoVaR and ΔCoVaR are performed due to the refined nature 
of conditional estimation. VaR is calculated as before (equations 14 and 15), and 
instead of treating the system (OMX Nordic 40, EuroStoxx50) as the dependent 
variable (as in equations 18 and 19), we now regress each bank i on each bank j in 
the sample, i.e we get an entity-to-entity analysis, instead of an entity(sector)-to-
system analysis. As before, the quantile of interest is 1%.  
 
 𝑋푡푏푎푛푘 푖 푏푎푛푘 푗 𝑞 = 𝛼푞푖 푗 + 𝛽푞,1푖 푗𝑋푡푖 + 𝛽푞,2푖 푗𝑀푡 + 𝜀푡푖 푗   (22) 
 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푡푏푎푛푘 푖 푏푎푛푘 푗 𝑞 = 𝛼0푖 푗 + 𝛽푞,1푖 푗 𝑉𝑎𝑅푡푗 𝑞 + 𝛽푞,2푖 푗𝑀푡   (23) 
 ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푡푏푎푛푘 푖 푏푎푛푘 푗(𝑞) = 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푡푏푎푛푘 푖 푏푎푛푘 푗 𝑞 − 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅푡푏푎푛푘 푖 푏푎푛푘 푗 𝑞 = 50%   (24)4 
 
In the table below we find the individual 1% conditional (average) VaR of the 
chosen banks; Danske Bank, Nordea, SEB and Swedbank. 5 
 
 
Table 5 1% and 50 % conditional average VaR of Danske bank, Nordea, SEB and Swedbank (2002.01-
2014.03) 
 
DANSKE BANK NORDEA  SEB SWEDBANK 
1%-VaR -0,053257 -0,049321 -0,054985 -0,057739 
50%-VaR -0,000097 -0,000139 -0,000104 0,000246 
 
 
Looking at bank risk in isolation, as measured by their 1%-VaR, we observe in 
table 1 that Swedbank is considered the most risky and Nordea the least risky. 
Next we estimate the 1% conditional average CoVaR of bank i given that another 
bank j is in financial distress (at its 1%-VaR level), with results presented in table 
6 below. The regression in equation 22 is run three times for each bank, and then 
CoVaR is constructed using the estimated coefficients as in equation 23. On the 
top horizontal row in table 6 we find the dependent variables and the vertical left 
column represents the conditioning, independent, variables in addition to the macro 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Coefficient estimates in appendix 7 
5 The attentive reader might notice that one of the major Nordic banks, Handelsbanken, is missing. This does 
however not affect the results.  
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variables. The 1% CoVaR estimation captures the spillover effects arising from a 
bank j falling into financial distress.  
 
Table 6 1% conditional CoVaR with conditioning variable on vertical axis (bank i) and dependent 
variable on horizontal axis (bank j), i.e. 1% VaR of bank j conditional on bank i being at its 1% -VaR 
 
DANSKE BANK NORDEA  SEB  SWEDBANK  Average 
Danske - -0,06256 -0,07656 -0,07644 -0,07185 
Nordea -0,06253 - -0,07696 -0,07496 -0,07148 
SEB -0,05683 -0,06675 - -0,07931 -0,06763 
Swedbank -0,06382 -0,06634 -0,08076 - -0,07030 
Average -0,06106 -0,06522 -0,07809 -0,07690 - 
 
Observing the results in the table above, spillover is considered as largest from 
Danske Bank, with an average spillover effect of 7,185 % and Nordea with 7,148 %. 
This seems rather logical as regards to their size; Nordea and Danske Bank are 
considered as the largest banks in the Nordic region as measured by their asset size. 
For example, 1%-CoVaR of Danske bank of -0,06253 means that when Nordea 
reaches its 1%-VaR level, the VaR of Danske Bank is affected by 6,253%. The 
VaRs of SEB and Swedbank are considered to be affected the most when other 
banks are in financial distress.  
 
In order to quantify how much each bank contributes to the risk of another bank 
we now consider ΔCoVaR, as defined in equation 24 and with results in table 7.  
 
Table 7 ΔCoVaR of banks; i.e. how much bank j’s (horizontal axis) VaR is affected when bank i 
(vertical axis) goes from being in median state (50%-VaR) into financial distress (1%-VaR) 
 
DANSKE BANK NORDEA  SEB  SWEDBANK Average 
Danske - -0,06241 -0,07643 -0,07644 -0,07176 
Nordea -0,06244 - -0,07683 -0,07496 -0,07141 
SEB -0,05692 -0,06669 - -0,07931 -0,06764 
Swedbank -0,06383 -0,06639 -0,08086 - -0,07036 
Average -0,06106 -0,06516 -0,07804 -0,07690 - 
 
To recapitulate, the interpretation of ΔCoVaR is as follows; for example, Danske 
Bank’s ΔCoVaR of -0,06244 means that the 1%-VaR of Danske Bank is affected 
6,244% when Nordea goes from being in median state (50%-VaR) into financial 
distress, i.e. being at its 1%-VaR. By looking at the average values and making this 
interpretation, we can see that Nordea is the bank that is assumed to be least 
unaffected by the other banks in the sample moving from a median state into 
financial distress. In the same fashion, SEB is considered most vulnerable, or 
unstable. Danske bank is considered to be the bank affecting the other banks the 
most, and Swedbank is considered the bank with smallest influence. This seems 
logical as Swedbank is the smallest of the banks considered, and Danske bank is 
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considered as one of the largest (after Nordea). These conclusions also confirm 
previous research on size being a predictor of ΔCoVaR.  
 
Connecting to risk in isolation as opposed to contribution to other banks’ risk, we 
saw in table 5 that Swedbank was considered the most risky and Nordea the least. 
In table 7 (in the vertical average column) we however observe that Nordea is one 
of the banks affecting the VaRs of other banks the most. This again confirms the 
previously observed conclusion that just because an institution is risky in isolation, 
does not mean that it spills this risk over and has an impact on other institutions 
to the same extent. 
 
For a more appealing risk contribution illustration, we present the picture below 
illustrating each bank’s ΔCoVaR; i.e. how much the VaR of bank i is affected if 
bank j moves from it’s median state (50%-VaR) into financial distress (1%-VaR), 
all other things equal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 Summary and conclusions 
The aim of this essay was to measure systemic risk contribution of Nordic firms 
and answer the question what firms contribute most to systemic risk of the Nordic 
stock market. Measuring spillover effects and systemic risk contribution of sectors, 
as measured by their CoVaR and ΔCoVaR respectively, is an important means of 
assessing risk both for the firm in isolation, but also for regulators and the economy 
as a whole, when financial markets are growing and becoming more integrated.  
 
The CoVaR methodology proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) involves 
estimating a “conditional” VaR, i.e. the (1%) VaR of a financial system, given an 
Figure 15 Illustration of how each bank is affected by another bank moving from it’s 50%-VaR to its 1%-
VaR, i.e. the ΔCoVaR’s of Danske bank, Nordea, SEB and Swedbank 
SEB 
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institution i being in financial distress. Simply put, it is a measure of how the 
institution being in financial distress affects the VaR of the overall financial system 
it is included in. In order to obtain how much the institution contributes to 
systemic risk of the system, a median state CoVaR is calculated for the system, i.e. 
how much (1%) VaR of the system, is affected by the institution being in median 
state, i.e. on 50%-VaR. ΔCoVaR is obtained by taking the difference between the 
two. The methodology can be implemented using different estimation methods, but 
the most common and straightforward method, and the one used in this essay, is 
quantile regression. 
 
This “conditional” VaR can be estimated in a conditional and unconditional way. 
A conditional estimation of CoVaR involves conditioning on a set of macro 
variables that are assumed to explain stock returns; in this way we obtain a time-
varying measure. The unconditional estimation yields estimates based on historical 
simulation and produces a constant measure of CoVaR and ΔCoVaR based on 
previous returns data only. Estimations were performed on a sample of 37 stocks’ 
returns listed on the OMX Nordic 40 Index, consisting of Swedish, Danish and 
Finnish stocks, denominated in SEK, DKK and EUR, covering the period January 
2002 to March 2014. Due to limited space, firm specific results were aggregated 
into sector specific results, representing the following ten sectors: Transportation, 
Manufacturing, Health care, Automotive, Consumer products, Financials, 
Telecommunications, Utility, Construction and Forestry.  
 
The results indicate that there is no (visible) positive relationship between an 
institution’s VaR and its ΔCoVaR, as one might think, i.e. just because an 
institution is risky in isolation, as measured by its VaR, it is not necessarily the 
case that is contributes most to systemic risk. However, in three cases (Forestry, 
Telecommunications and Manufacturing) we observe a 1% VaR that is larger than 
the sectors’ corresponding ΔCoVaRs, indicating that their contribution to systemic 
risk is larger than their risk in isolation, as measured by unconditional VaR and 
CoVaR. On the other hand, sectors with a high volatility of returns tended to have 
a high VaR also. 
 
The results also indicate that different sectors affect the VaR of the financial 
system differently. Among those having highest spillover effects measured by 
CoVaR were the Construction and Financials sectors as well as the European stock 
market. Turning to what sectors contribute the most to Nordic systemic risk, we 
logically find the European stock market, as well as the Construction, Financials 
and Automotive sectors. Forestry, Health care and Transportation are the sectors 
concluded to contribute least to Nordic systemic risk.  
 
Turning to the conditional estimations, i.e. VaR, CoVaR and ΔCoVaR estimations 
conditioned on macro variables representing the business cycle, trend and 
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expectations and investor sentiment, they yield similar results to the unconditional 
estimates. What separates them is that we now control for market-specific “risks” 
and events that apply to all firms, in order to obtain a refined estimate. The 
principal difference was that all ΔCoVaR estimates were above (in absolute value) 
their respective VaR estimates, indicating that all institutions contributed less to 
systemic risk than they were risky in isolation. Here we find the European stock 
market and Forestry and Construction sectors contributing the most to Nordic 
systemic risk, which is different than from the unconditional estimations were 
Forestry was one of the sectors contributing the least. We also observe that 
contribution to systemic risk and spillover effects, as measured by ΔCoVaR and 
CoVaR respectively, are higher in periods of financial distress than in other periods, 
i.e. negative financial events seem to have greater impact than positive.   
 
As a special case study, the relationship between the banks included in the OMX 
Nordic 40 index is also examined. Here, we find that Swedbank is the most risky 
(has the largest VaR) and Nordea the least risky, but the other way around when 
looking at ΔCoVaR; i.e. Nordea appears to be the bank that affects other banks 
the most, in this framework.  
 
The results of this essay contribute to the growing field of research on systemic risk 
and risk contribution by the examination of Nordic countries. This has, until now, 
not yet been evaluated with the CoVaR methodology.  
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Appendices 1-7 
 
Appendix 1 List of firms included in the data, from OMX Nordic 40 Index 
members. Alfa Laval, Sv. Handelsbanken and ABB not included in the analysis 
due to problems with data.  
 
 
Stock Currency Sector 
1 AUTOLIV SEK AUTOMOTIVE 
2 ASSA ABLOY B SEK MANUFACTURING 
3 ATLAS COPCO A & B SEK MANUFACTURING 
4 ASTRAZENECA SEK HEALTH CARE 
5 CARLSBERG B DKK CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
6 COLOPLAST B DKK HEALTH CARE 
7 DANSKE BANK DKK FINANCIALS 
8 ELEKTA B SEK HEALTH CARE 
9 ELECTROLUX B SEK CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
10 ERICSSON B SEK TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
11 FORTUM EUR UTILITY 
12 GETINGE SEK HEALTH CARE 
13 H&M B SEK CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
14 INVESTOR B SEK FINANCIALS 
15 KINNEVIK B SEK FINANCIALS 
16 KONE EUR MANUFACTURING 
17 AP MÖLLER MAERSK B DKK TRANSPORTATION 
18 NORDEA BANK SEK FINANCIALS 
19 NOKIA EUR TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
20 NOKIAN RENKAAT DKK MANUFACTURING 
21 SAMPO A EUR FINANCIALS 
22 SANDVIK SEK MANUFACTURING 
23 SCA B SEK CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
24 SCANIA B SEK AUTOMOTIVE 
25 SEB A SEK FINANCIALS 
26 SKANSKA B SEK CONSTRUCTION 
27 SKF B SEK MANUFACTURING 
28 STORA ENSO R EUR FORESTRY 
29 SWEDBANK A SEK FINANCIALS 
30 SWEDISH MATCH SEK CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
31 TDC DKK TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
32 TELIASONERA SEK TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
33 UPM KYMMENE EUR FORESTRY 
34 VOLVO SEK MANUFACTURING 
35 VESTAS WIND SYSTEMS DKK MANUFACTURING 
36 NOVO NORDISK B DKK HEALTH CARE 
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Appendix 2 Quantile regression coefficient estimates for creating unconditional 
and conditional 1%-VaR, 50%-VaR, 1%-CoVaR and 50%-CoVaR, all necessary to 
construct ΔCoVaR, i.e. estimates of unknown parameters in equations 1, 3, 5, 8, 
10, 14, 16 and 18.  
 
VaR 1% Unconditional Conditional 
  
 
α α β1 (volatility) β2 (S&P500) β3 (euribor) 
A.P Möller Maersk -0,05319*** -0,04386*** -0,14482*** 0,38648*** 0,37874*** 
Assa Abloy B -0,05431*** -0,04615*** -0,14462*** 0,34695*** 0,71655*** 
Astra Zeneca -0,04367*** -0,04168*** -0,12614*** 0,16169 0,59315*** 
Atlas Copco A -0,05462*** -0,04342*** -0,17688*** 0,40151*** 0,45949*** 
Atlas Copco B -0,05882*** -0,04499*** -0,20605*** 0,37798*** 0,42973*** 
Autoliv SDB -0,04762*** -0,04312*** -0,17391 0,23716*** 0,59619*** 
Carlsberg B -0,05544*** -0,05226*** -0,16392*** 0,35635*** 0,59411*** 
Coloplast B -0,03835*** -0,03532*** -0,03635** 0,26757*** 0,48324*** 
Danske Bank -0,06122*** -0,05248*** -0,21142*** 0,28208*** 0,74472*** 
Electrolux B -0,06620*** -0,05141*** -0,18350*** 0,23743*** 0,55498*** 
Elekta B -0,05565*** -0,04926*** -0,13859*** 0,03036 0,08807 
Ericsson B -0,08031*** -0,07143*** 0,13358*** 0,66774*** 0,54199 
Fortum -0,05296*** -0,04653*** -0,14375*** 0,17798*** 0,35747** 
Getinge -0,04415*** -0,03934*** -0,09815*** 0,01172*** -0,24532** 
H&M B -0,04552*** -0,03829*** -0,17497*** -0,00601 0,28659* 
Investor B -0,04720*** -0,03449*** -0,16382*** 0,33824*** 0,53783*** 
Kinnevik B -0,06050*** -0,04926*** -0,26498*** 0,17429* 0,65180*** 
Kone B -0,04768*** -0,04195*** -0,15429*** 0,18000*** 0,32054 
Nokia -0,07895*** -0,07172*** -0,17206 0,13216 0,79704*** 
Nokian Renkaat -0,06199*** -0,0539***2 -0,11360*** 0,24112 0,14682 
Nordea Bank -0,05854*** -0,04856*** -0,19123*** 0,48565*** 0,83979*** 
Novo nordisk B -0,04633*** -0,04211*** -0,09568*** 0,13246 0,56047*** 
Sampo A -0,04806*** -0,03850*** -0,13050*** 0,43933*** 0,57635*** 
Sandvik -0,05532*** -0,04466*** -0,16279*** 0,25934*** 0,61524*** 
SCA B -0,04082*** -0,03563*** -0,12390*** 0,24484*** 0,05940 
Scania B -0,05903*** -0,04629*** -0,19149*** 0,35509*** 0,62804*** 
SEB A -0,06882*** -0,05409*** -0,28371*** 0,56816*** 0,84896*** 
Skanska B -0,05227*** -0,04158*** -0,14434*** 0,17272*** 0,43471*** 
SKF B -0,05150*** -0,04299*** -0,19110** 0,30602*** 0,07663 
Stora Enso R -0,06167*** -0,05219*** -0,12003*** 0,09691* 0,85363*** 
Swedbank A -0,07192*** -0,05677*** -0,25201*** 0,66963*** 1,05345*** 
Swedish Match -0,04593*** -0,04268*** -0,03891 0,30121 -0,24459 
TDC -0,04573*** -0,04310*** -0,19754*** -0,03672 0,67472*** 
TeliaSonera -0,05769*** -0,04947*** -0,27580*** -0,26027 -0,22509 
UPM Kymmene -0,06170*** -0,05605*** -0,06204*** 0,26708*** 0,56410*** 
Vestas Windsystems -0,09327*** -0,08374*** -0,27714*** 0,53027*** 0,82006 
Volvo B -0,06075*** -0,04193*** -0,16147*** 0,44814*** 0,48868*** 
Average -0,05642 -0,04787 -0,15562 0,26980 0,47725 
OMX  -0,04381*** -0,03005*** -0,18956*** 0,21025*** 0,22440** 
EUROSTOXX -0,04693*** -0,02279*** -0,20440*** 0,35178*** 0,27714*** 
 
 
	   48 
VaR 50% Unconditional Conditional 
  
 
α α β1 (volatility) β2 (S&P500) β3 (euribor) 
A.P Möller Maersk 0,00000 0,00000 -0,10378*** 0,29929*** -0,00611 
Assa Aboly B 0,00000 0,00022 -0,11753*** 0,35640*** -0,03350 
Astra Zeneca 0,00000 0,00000 -0,06262*** 0,08970*** -0,00186 
Atlas Copco A 0,00000 0,00023 -0,14446*** 0,44770*** 0,04714 
Atlas Copco B 0,00000 0,00037 -0,15170*** 0,46288*** 0,03686 
Autoliv SDB 0,00000 0,00000 -0,10300*** 0,23361*** 0,01608 
Carlsberg B 0,00000 0,00000 -0,06632*** 0,18258*** 0,03790 
Coloplast B 0,00000 0,00013 -0,04435*** 0,09116** 0,00398 
Danske Bank 0,00000 0,00000 -0,10371*** 0,22756*** -0,00689 
Electrolux B 0,00000 0,00000 -0,11230*** 0,42860*** -0,03379 
Elekta B 0,00000 0,00018 -0,07407*** 0,15249*** 0,00281 
Ericsson B 0,00000 0,00000 -0,11579*** 0,36465*** -0,01140 
Fortum 0,00000 0,00028 -0,07327*** 0,17327*** 0,00012 
Getinge 0,00000 0,00023 -0,07620*** 0,22617*** -0,01369 
H&M B 0,00000 0,00016 -0,08798*** 0,23053*** -0,02767 
Investor B 0,00000 0,00021 -0,12295*** 0,32236*** 0,03543 
Kinnevik B 0,00000 0,00039 -0,10761*** 0,32328*** 0,02275 
Kone B 0,00000 0,00027 -0,09286*** 0,18824*** -0,00623 
Nokia 0,00000 0,00000 -0,15818*** 0,37302*** 0,03243 
Nokian Renkaat 0,00000 0,00043 -0,11671*** 0,30430*** 0,02271 
Nordea Bank 0,00000 0,00000 -0,13144*** 0,35805*** 0,03570 
Novo nordisk B 0,00000 0,00024 -0,04683*** 0,11285*** -0,07148 
Sampo A 0,00000 0,00028 -0,10051*** 0,27724*** 0,00016 
Sandvik 0,00000 0,00028 -0,13330*** 0,40852*** 0,04300 
SCA B 0,00000 0,00000 -0,08206*** 0,22632*** -0,01397 
Scania B 0,00000 0,00000 -0,11554*** 0,36302*** 0,08564 
SEB A 0,00000 0,00000 -0,13336*** 0,51539*** 0,03527 
Skanska B 0,00000 0,00029 -0,10389*** 0,39708*** 0,01408 
SKF B 0,00000 0,00000 -0,11646*** 0,43378*** 0,04041 
Stora Enso R 0,00000 0,00000 -0,14373*** 0,36345*** 0,06660 
Swedbank A 0,00000 0,00038 -0,11912*** 0,40526*** 0,06721 
Swedish Match 0,00000 0,00012 -0,04770*** 0,11582*** -0,02454 
TDC 0,00000 0,00000 -0,03288*** 0,06113** 0,01340 
TeliaSonera 0,00000 0,00000 -0,09011*** 0,25870*** 0,00237 
UPM Kymmene 0,00000 0,00000 -0,12492*** 0,29679*** 0,08639 
Vestas Windsystems 0,00000 0,00000 -0,16184*** 0,20578*** 0,04962 
Volvo B 0,00000 0,00024 -0,13139*** 0,44667*** 0,05012 
Average 0,00000 0,00013 -0,10407 0,28983 0,01614 
OMX  0,00033 0,00023 -0,12369*** 0,35626*** 0,00403 
EUROSTOXX 0,00000 0,00000 -0,13678*** 0,38389*** 0,02855 
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CoVaR 1% Unconditional Conditional 
   
 
α β1 α βi (stock) β2 (volatility) β3(S&P500) β4 (euribor) 
A.P Möller Maersk -0,03507*** 0,37272*** -0,02893*** 0,14816*** -0,15590*** 0,17151*** 0,13626 
Assa Aboly B -0,03255*** 0,43731*** -0,02610*** 0,30920*** -0,15127*** 0,12683*** 0,21284** 
Astra Zeneca -0,04222*** 0,27920*** -0,03071*** 0,13207** -0,17224*** 0,18480*** 0,27573** 
Atlas Copco A -0,03070*** 0,49490*** -0,02657*** 0,28435*** -0,13969*** 0,08656*** 0,09366 
Atlas Copco B -0,03106*** 0,49900*** -0,02669*** 0,30535*** -0,12993*** 0,07678*** 0,13620 
Autoliv SDB -0,03862*** 0,45510*** -0,02900*** 0,23277*** -0,16873*** 0,25046*** 0,20621 
Carlsberg B -0,03675*** 0,32570*** -0,02955*** 0,14213*** -0,18510*** 0,12524 0,15330 
Coloplast B -0,04132*** 0,33931*** -0,02854*** 0,21293*** -0,18714*** 0,09809*** 0,25941*** 
Danske Bank -0,03550*** 0,38188*** -0,02834*** 0,22764*** -0,13941*** 0,20834*** 0,20103*** 
Electrolux B -0,03448*** 0,32942*** -0,02762*** 0,17919*** -0,15847*** 0,14096*** 0,16632 
Elekta B -0,04119*** 0,34219*** -0,02934*** 0,16060*** -0,16038*** 0,18723*** 0,25633*** 
Ericsson B -0,03333*** 0,29798*** -0,02569*** 0,22407*** -0,14364*** 0,18769*** 0,25121*** 
Fortum -0,03644*** 0,41562*** -0,02907*** 0,22418*** -0,16845*** 0,10725*** 0,26346** 
Getinge -0,03675*** 0,51733*** -0,02968*** 0,19358** -0,17296*** 0,14731*** 0,21790* 
H&M B -0,03339*** 0,52154*** -0,02637*** 0,30833*** -0,14824*** 0,17544*** 0,10956 
Investor B -0,02633*** 0,72658*** -0,02341*** 0,52960*** -0,09138*** 0,06480*** 0,15184* 
Kinnevik B -0,03572*** 0,43322*** -0,02889*** 0,19859*** -0,18639*** 0,15717*** 0,20293* 
Kone B -0,03649*** 0,53214*** -0,02857*** 0,32740*** -0,13448*** 0,17076*** 0,36224*** 
Nokia -0,03001*** 0,36349*** -0,02361*** 0,22589*** -0,13551*** 0,16386*** 0,13718 
Nokian Renkaat -0,03808*** 0,29908*** -0,02835*** 0,16828*** -0,17071*** 0,14182*** 0,13244 
Nordea Bank -0,03064*** 0,51154*** -0,02455*** 0,35282*** -0,12852*** 0,18107*** 0,14536** 
Novo nordisk B -0,04137*** 0,39555*** -0,02945*** 0,26326*** -0,14633*** 0,21658*** 0,39961*** 
Sampo A -0,03500*** 0,45733*** -0,02810*** 0,24361** -0,15612** 0,09653 0,17205* 
Sandvik -0,03102*** 0,50654*** -0,02638*** 0,26198*** -0,16422*** 0,10734* 0,18152** 
SCA B -0,03675*** 0,52213*** -0,02843*** 0,32271*** -0,15247*** 0,13566*** 0,28986*** 
Scania B -0,03487*** 0,37013*** -0,02891*** 0,13606*** -0,18363*** 0,13659*** 0,21997** 
SEB A -0,03060*** 0,36752*** -0,02635*** 0,21620*** -0,15482*** 0,07757*** 0,12566 
Skanska B -0,03201*** 0,55292*** -0,02585*** 0,36911*** -0,13292*** 0,15835*** 0,08765 
SKF B -0,03183*** 0,50211*** -0,02638*** 0,31579*** -0,14873*** 0,13709*** 0,15433* 
Stora Enso R -0,03551*** 0,38915*** -0,02652*** 0,25228*** -0,14024*** 0,13093*** 0,24250*** 
Swedbank A -0,03492*** 0,38128*** -0,02932*** 0,19919*** -0,15203*** 0,07880*** 0,20214 
Swedish Match -0,04074*** 0,39190*** -0,03042*** 0,07868 -0,19746*** 0,18069*** 0,19265* 
TDC -0,04080*** 0,27987*** -0,02913*** 0,17346*** -0,17609*** 0,20373*** 0,24026*** 
TeliaSonera -0,03456*** 0,45543*** -0,02741*** 0,31279*** -0,13726*** 0,14839*** 0,27171** 
UPM Kymmene -0,03277*** 0,52115*** -0,02750*** 0,31146*** -0,13686*** 0,12619*** 0,29366*** 
Vestas Windsystems -0,03681*** 0,19871*** -0,02801*** 0,10117*** -0,15328*** 0,21705*** 0,13266*** 
Volvo B -0,03126*** 0,44354*** -0,02625*** 0,29046*** -0,15700*** 0,06397 0,15323** 
Average -0,03507 0,42191 -0,02767 0,24150 -0,15454 0,14512 0,20083 
OMX  -0,02197*** 0,83435*** -0,02243*** 0,83213*** -0,02132*** -0,04701*** -0,15952*** 
EUROSTOXX -0,02195*** 0,94516*** -0,01705*** 0,54456*** -0,10431 0,20418 0,22820 
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CoVaR 50% Unconditional Conditional 
 
 
α β1 α βi (stock) β2 (volatility) 32 (S&P500) β4 (euribor) 
A.P Möller Maersk 0,00000 0,39324*** 0,00022 0,23835*** -0,09562*** 0,29439*** -0,00512 
Assa Aboly B 0,00000 0,47144*** 0,00000 0,29464*** -0,08844*** 0,24263*** 0,00000 
Astra Zeneca 0,00000 0,31754*** 0,00024 0,12053*** -0,11555*** 0,35089*** -0,00270 
Atlas Copco A 0,00000 0,50976*** 0,00000 0,34974*** -0,06884*** 0,21111*** -0,00108 
Atlas Copco B 0,00000 0,47660*** 0,00000 0,32213*** -0,07319*** 0,20722*** 0,00486 
Autoliv SDB 0,00000 0,45263*** 0,00031** 0,25286*** -0,09269*** 0,29951*** -0,00082 
Carlsberg B 0,00035* 0,31390*** 0,00012 0,16913*** -0,10890*** 0,33160*** 0,04459** 
Coloplast B 0,00020 0,48716*** 0,00000 0,13504*** -0,11715*** 0,33450*** -0,00267*** 
Danske Bank 0,00026 0,43216*** 0,00025 0,24299*** -0,09459*** 0,30880*** 0,01249 
Electrolux B 0,00000 0,42688*** 0,00014 0,24722*** -0,08976*** 0,27343*** -0,00333 
Elekta B 0,00000 0,19513*** 0,00023 0,10850*** -0,11287*** 0,35148*** 0,01083 
Ericsson B 0,00000 0,36133*** 0,00021 0,23070*** -0,09514*** 0,25931*** 0,00286 
Fortum 0,00000 0,32550*** 0,00016 0,16140*** -0,10949*** 0,33576*** 0,01693 
Getinge 0,00000 0,37619*** 0,00000 0,20173*** -0,10430*** 0,33149*** -0,00567 
H&M B 0,00000 0,58114*** 0,00018 0,32914*** -0,08989*** 0,32810*** 0,00727 
Investor B 0,00000 0,68472*** 0,00000 0,49923*** -0,05715*** 0,20537*** -0,02370 
Kinnevik B 0,00000 0,43807*** 0,00000 0,25187*** -0,09446*** 0,28587*** -0,03239 
Kone B 0,00000 0,42684*** 0,00000 0,23766*** -0,09602*** 0,30133*** -0,00611 
Nokia 0,00020 0,42872*** 0,00012 0,27743*** -0,08245*** 0,25222*** 0,02825 
Nokian Renkaat 0,00000 0,29927*** 0,00000 0,15084*** -0,09946*** 0,34870*** -0,00126 
Nordea Bank 0,00000 0,56535*** 0,00000 0,38580*** -0,07473*** 0,19595*** -0,01711 
Novo nordisk B 0,00000 0,27335*** 0,00000 0,17214*** -0,11935*** 0,33029*** -0,00345 
Sampo A 0,00000 0,52528*** 0,00012 0,29570*** -0,09438*** 0,26837*** 0,00939 
Sandvik 0,00000 0,50347*** 0,00000 0,34051*** -0,07604*** 0,19659*** -0,00456 
SCA B 0,00000 0,58891*** 0,00020 0,34278*** -0,09284*** 0,27837*** 0,00802 
Scania B 0,00000 0,47404*** 0,00000 0,29458*** -0,08653*** 0,25217*** -0,01089 
SEB A 0,00000 0,47234*** 0,00016 0,30617*** -0,07952*** 0,21413*** -0,01946 
Skanska B 0,00000 0,56557*** 0,00000 0,35716*** -0,07981*** 0,24786*** 0,00336 
SKF B 0,00000 0,53490*** 0,00011 0,34745*** -0,07647*** 0,21233*** -0,02139 
Stora Enso R 0,00027 0,42344*** 0,00031** 0,26070*** -0,08269*** 0,26588*** -0,00395 
Swedbank A 0,00000 0,44587*** 0,00014 0,26597*** -0,08843*** 0,24206*** -0,01961 
Swedish Match 0,00019 0,21626*** 0,00024 0,09457*** -0,11596*** 0,35641*** 0,03043* 
TDC 0,00011 0,27145*** 0,00000 0,15341*** -0,11888*** 0,33106*** -0,00692 
TeliaSonera 0,00000 0,46739*** 0,00013 0,26914*** -0,09362*** 0,31647*** 0,02168 
UPM Kymmene 0,00029* 0,46202*** 0,00026* 0,27473*** -0,08696*** 0,26948*** -0,02335 
Vestas Windsystems 0,00000 0,17603*** 0,00000 0,09300*** -0,10733*** 0,33022*** -0,00222 
Volvo B 0,00000 0,50668*** 0,00015 0,33688*** -0,07376*** 0,21566*** -0,00536 
Average 0,00005 0,42893 0,00011 0,25437 -0,09279 0,28046 -0,00060 
OMX  0,00000 0,87295*** 0,00000 0,81924*** -0,01041*** 0,03981** -0,01755 
EUROSTOXX 0,00000 0,82625*** -0,00013 0,54376*** -0,07220*** 0,18870*** 0,01883 
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Appendix 3 Descriptive statistics of returns data (firm specific) 
 
Stock Mean St. Dev Max Min Kurtosis Skewness 
AUTOLIV SDB 0,00053180 0,01880287 0,13398693 -0,15945946 6,12554780 0,17987263 
ASSA ABLOY 'B' 0,00048509 0,02130778 0,17006803 -0,16766467 6,20590423 0,19348401 
ATLAS COPCO 'A' 0,00082139 0,02251783 0,15512979 -0,13401177 4,27906559 0,31571545 
ATLAS COPCO 'B' 0,00085496 0,02360486 0,15240578 -0,13906378 3,89690182 0,34179017 
ASTRAZENECA (OME) 0,00008006 0,01563685 0,12859560 -0,11756168 6,78329970 0,00924778 
CARLSBERG 'B' 0,00043212 0,02064207 0,15657895 -0,17480035 10,08648786 -0,07012999 
COLOPLAST 'B' 0,00077125 0,01557043 0,13833992 -0,16876574 10,32306549 0,20210832 
DANSKE BANK 0,00028192 0,02099931 0,14989194 -0,15787763 6,01008848 0,19144955 
ELEKTA 'B' 0,00103319 0,02156114 0,14923707 -0,15217391 4,59340943 0,05134615 
ELECTROLUX 'B' 0,00046629 0,02351379 0,21146953 -0,18778142 7,38026511 0,32481519 
ERICSSON 'B' 0,00014158 0,02873761 0,25000000 -0,23958655 11,16727462 0,15053110 
FORTUM 0,00064206 0,01795081 0,14601227 -0,11381074 6,58611140 0,17266213 
GETINGE 0,00062625 0,01810193 0,12307692 -0,21443919 10,19869725 -0,46819171 
H & M 'B' 0,00043049 0,01663935 0,12962963 -0,10765550 5,42423074 0,25758616 
INVESTOR 'B' 0,00038042 0,01770171 0,14615385 -0,10317460 5,02195363 0,24370370 
KINNEVIK 'B' 0,00070825 0,02155224 0,16197183 -0,16384181 7,25084626 0,00804729 
KONE 'B' 0,00098953 0,01843374 0,12121212 -0,12121212 3,97159870 0,22366310 
A P M-MAERSK 'B' 0,00052231 0,02141576 0,26324615 -0,12993039 11,45201867 0,79662523 
NORDEA BANK 0,00046356 0,02170132 0,16082005 -0,11497249 6,43225980 0,62760738 
NOKIA -0,00013982 0,02778473 0,34121622 -0,17567568 11,43403826 0,20955442 
NOVO NORDISK 'B' 0,00077655 0,01766192 0,18155620 -0,21354934 15,97266561 -0,43729374 
NOKIAN RENKAAT 0,00098238 0,02518959 0,24612920 -0,21674877 9,94824685 0,17495313 
SAMPO 'A' 0,00061993 0,01811629 0,12801484 -0,16666667 8,37368981 -0,21386091 
SANDVIK 0,00047036 0,02167420 0,14114833 -0,14869888 4,32596721 0,18709100 
SCA 'B' 0,00034731 0,01624885 0,12053571 -0,12141280 6,72945387 0,33654809 
SCANIA 'B' 0,00070487 0,02199708 0,31864407 -0,11573343 16,88694774 1,27260170 
SEB 'A' 0,00052051 0,02600612 0,26130653 -0,20006081 11,50553478 0,62033033 
SKANSKA 'B' 0,00043920 0,01945785 0,16883117 -0,12676056 5,88861163 0,37440941 
SKF 'B' 0,00064594 0,02097561 0,13427562 -0,09682312 3,91849951 0,48576448 
STORA ENSO 'R' 0,00006574 0,02279786 0,15711645 -0,10730253 3,30694604 0,35018705 
SWEDBANK 'A' 0,00044958 0,02447306 0,18955399 -0,18565956 9,07558780 0,19196424 
SWEDISH MATCH 0,00054552 0,01592095 0,10874704 -0,09547739 3,78631747 0,14651965 
TDC 0,00015025 0,01887396 0,16414435 -0,52948718 200,88826461 -6,62028503 
TELIASONERA 0,00020723 0,01927853 0,21537046 -0,12907410 10,72921069 0,35584847 
UPM-KYMMENE 0,00010245 0,02143545 0,12005857 -0,10020450 3,15127658 0,11230062 
VOLVO 'B' 0,00061757 0,02219317 0,16332378 -0,14252874 3,92987673 0,16959992 
VESTAS WINDSYST 0,00070048 0,03692302 0,44398196 -0,31656938 14,31458777 0,49744994 
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Appendix 4 Jarque-Bera statistics for normality of sector returns and their 
empirical distributions; Automotive, Construction, Consumer products, 
Financials, Forestry, Health care, Telecommunications, Transportation, Utility 
and Manufacturing.  
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Appendix 5 Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for stationarity of macro variables; 
Volatility of EuroStoxx50, S&P500 and 3M Euribor interest rate, levels and first-
differences tested, with constant and linear trend, constant and neither included 
in the underlying test equation. Automatic selection of lags.  
 
   
Constant, Linear trend Constant None 
EuroStoxx50 Volatility p-value 0,02020 0,00400 0.1175 
  
BIC 4,01396 4,01150 4,01255 
d-EuroStoxx50 Volatility p-value 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 
  
BIC -2,84723 -2,84974 -2,85139 
S&P 
 
p-value 0,86360 0,91930 0,90700 
  
BIC 8,10332 8,10934 8,09949 
d-S&P 
 
p-value 0,00000 0,00010 0,00010 
  
BIC -5,89583 -5,89801 -5,90012 
Euribor3M 
 
p-value 0,87660 0,79340 0,17870 
  
BIC -6,46209 -6,46426 -6,46678 
d-Euribor3M 
 
p-value 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 
  
BIC -7,53848 -7,54077 -7,54251 
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Appendix 6 Conditional (averages) and unconditional firm specific numerical 
estimates of 50%-VaR, 50%-CoVaR, 1%-VaR, 1%-CoVaR and ΔCoVaR, 
estimated by using estimates in appendix 2 and according to equations 2, 4, 6, 7, 
9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19-21. 
 
Conditional estimation 
i/system VaR 50 % CoVaR 50% VaR 1% CoVaR 1% ΔCoVaR 
A P MOLLER -MAERSK 'B' -0,0000811 0,0020899 -0,0442550 -0,0357801 -0,0378701 
ASSA ABLOY 'B' 0,0001482 -0,0000321 -0,0467976 -0,0409167 -0,0408847 
ASTRAZENECA (OME) -0,0000715 0,0001413 -0,0422593 -0,0367036 -0,0368449 
ATLAS COPCO 'A' 0,0000847 -0,0000234 -0,0439231 -0,0391199 -0,0390966 
ATLAS COPCO 'B' 0,0002257 0,0000081 -0,0455147 -0,0408594 -0,0408675 
AUTOLIV SDB -0,0001111 0,0002177 -0,0437483 -0,0395214 -0,0397391 
CARLSBERG 'B' -0,0000837 -0,0000165 -0,0528445 -0,0374151 -0,0373986 
COLOPLAST 'B' 0,0000830 -0,0000841 -0,0356545 -0,0365779 -0,0364937 
DANSKE BANK -0,0000972 0,0001470 -0,0532581 -0,0407700 -0,0409170 
ELECTROLUX 'B' -0,0000439 0,0000640 -0,0520300 -0,0372662 -0,0373303 
ELEKTA 'B' 0,0001067 0,0001430 -0,0495215 -0,0376716 -0,0378146 
ERICSSON 'B' -0,0000800 0,0001086 -0,0714675 -0,0420502 -0,0421588 
FORTUM 0,0002067 0,0000978 -0,0469611 -0,0400129 -0,0401107 
GETINGE 0,0001765 -0,0079950 -0,0392837 -0,0376669 -0,0296719 
HENNES & MAURITZ 'B' 0,0000965 -0,0067269 -0,0387552 -0,0385739 -0,0318470 
INVESTOR 'B' 0,0000769 0,0000177 -0,0350403 -0,0422273 -0,0422450 
KINNEVIK 'B' 0,0002882 0,0000210 -0,0500832 -0,0392201 -0,0392412 
KONE 'B' 0,0001711 -0,0000283 -0,0423639 -0,0428596 -0,0428312 
NOKIA -0,0001729 -0,0000116 -0,0725184 -0,0402507 -0,0402391 
NOKIAN RENKAAT 0,0003051 -0,0000205 -0,0541379 -0,0377754 -0,0377549 
NORDEA BANK -0,0001386 -0,0001074 -0,0493239 -0,0422045 -0,0420971 
NOVO NORDISK 'B' 0,0002442 -0,0000459 -0,0426222 -0,0411200 -0,0410741 
SAMPO 'A' 0,0001932 0,0000908 -0,0390060 -0,0379377 -0,0380285 
SANDVIK 0,0001422 -0,0000163 -0,0452823 -0,0385910 -0,0385747 
SCA 'B' -0,0000600 0,0000967 -0,0357968 -0,0403843 -0,0404811 
SCANIA 'B' -0,0001492 -0,0001069 -0,0469432 -0,0357000 -0,0355932 
SEB 'A' -0,0001044 0,0000769 -0,0549867 -0,0385418 -0,0386187 
SKANSKA 'B' 0,0002212 0,0000150 -0,0420625 -0,0416032 -0,0416182 
SKF 'B' -0,0001018 0,0000290 -0,0432572 -0,0403452 -0,0403742 
STORA ENSO 'R' -0,0001778 0,0002052 -0,0529525 -0,0402258 -0,0404310 
SWEDBANK 'A' 0,0002464 0,0001467 -0,0577425 -0,0401715 -0,0403181 
SWEDISH MATCH 0,0000971 0,0001321 -0,0424947 -0,0341506 -0,0342827 
TDC -0,0000445 -0,0001026 -0,0438896 -0,0371308 -0,0370282 
TELIASONERA -0,0000762 0,0000248 -0,0497836 -0,0433467 -0,0433715 
UPM-KYMMENE -0,0001194 0,0001756 -0,0564868 -0,0454796 -0,0456552 
VESTAS WINDSYSTEMS -0,0002297 -0,0001033 -0,0846220 -0,0368456 -0,0367422 
VOLVO 'B' 0,0001159 0,0001288 -0,0424213 -0,0388958 -0,0390246 
OMXNORDIC 0,0001232 0,0001071 -0,0304477 -0,0339060 -0,0340131 
EUROSTOXX50 -0,0001355 -0,0002801 -0,0232160 -0,0416795 -0,0413994 
	   55 
 
Unconditional estimation 
i/system VaR 50% CoVaR 50% VaR 1% CoVaR 1% ΔCoVaR 
A P MOLLER - MAERSK 'B' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,053191 -0,054892 -0,054892 
ASSA ABLOY 'B' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,054313 -0,056300 -0,056300 
ASTRAZENECA (OME) 0,000000 0,000000 -0,043672 -0,054411 -0,054411 
ATLAS COPCO 'A' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,054618 -0,057726 -0,057726 
ATLAS COPCO 'B' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,058824 -0,060415 -0,060415 
AUTOLIV SDB 0,000000 0,000000 -0,047619 -0,060291 -0,060291 
CARLSBERG 'B' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,055440 -0,054810 -0,054810 
COLOPLAST 'B' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,038345 -0,054328 -0,054328 
DANSKE BANK 0,000000 0,000000 -0,061220 -0,058880 -0,058880 
ELECTROLUX 'B' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,066202 -0,056287 -0,056287 
ELEKTA 'B' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,556520 -0,231624 -0,231624 
ERICSSON 'B' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,080311 -0,057277 -0,057277 
FORTUM 0,000000 0,000000 -0,052962 -0,058451 -0,058451 
GETINGE 0,000000 0,000000 -0,044145 -0,059583 -0,059583 
HENNES & MAURITZ 'B' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,045521 -0,057129 -0,057129 
INVESTOR 'B' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,047198 -0,060623 -0,060623 
KINNEVIK 'B' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,060498 -0,061927 -0,061927 
KONE 'B' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,047676 -0,061855 -0,061855 
NOKIA 0,000000 0,000000 -0,078947 -0,058710 -0,058710 
NOKIAN RENKAAT 0,000000 0,000000 -0,061988 -0,056620 -0,056620 
NORDEA BANK 0,000000 0,000000 -0,058539 -0,060584 -0,060584 
NOVO NORDISK 'B' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,046332 -0,059701 -0,059701 
SAMPO 'A' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,048059 -0,056977 -0,056977 
SANDVIK 0,000000 0,000000 -0,055319 -0,059044 -0,059044 
SCA 'B' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,040816 -0,058062 -0,058062 
SCANIA 'B' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,059028 -0,056716 -0,056716 
SEB 'A' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,068815 -0,055888 -0,055888 
SKANSKA 'B' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,052265 -0,060909 -0,060909 
SKF 'B' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,051499 -0,057692 -0,057692 
STORA ENSO 'R' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,061674 -0,059508 -0,059508 
SWEDBANK 'A' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,071924 -0,062342 -0,062342 
SWEDISH MATCH 0,000000 0,000000 -0,045929 -0,058742 -0,058742 
TDC 0,000000 0,000000 -0,045732 -0,053603 -0,053603 
TELIASONERA 0,000000 0,000000 -0,057692 -0,060830 -0,060830 
UPM-KYMMENE 0,000000 0,000000 -0,617040 -0,354336 -0,354336 
VESTAS WINDSYSTEMS 0,000000 0,000000 -0,093266 -0,055340 -0,055340 
VOLVO 'B' 0,000000 0,000000 -0,060748 -0,058201 -0,058493 
OMXNORDIC 0,000334 0,000291 -0,043810 -0,058521 -0,058521 
EUROSTOXX50 0,000000 0,000000 -0,046932 -0,066312 -0,066312 
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Appendix 7 Relevant coefficient estimates for 1% and 50% conditional 
CoVaR estimations of banks; Bank j in bold on the top left hand side is the 
dependent variable, regressed on the independent variable, bank j, in italics. 
22 regressions performed.  
 
 
q=1% 
 
q=50% 
 SEB 𝜶 𝜷 𝜶 𝜷 
Danske Bank -0,05886*** 0,74516*** 0,00000 0,57761*** 
Swedbank -0,04341*** 0,78481*** 0,00000 0,83665*** 
Nordea -0,04740*** 1,03201*** 0,00000 0,84767*** 
     Danske Bank 𝜶 𝜷 𝜶 𝜷 
SEB -0,04963*** 0,33846*** 0,00000 0,41413*** 
Swedbank -0,05006*** 0,42182*** 0,00000 0,43554*** 
Nordea -0,05093*** 0,47484*** 0,00000 0,48349*** 
     Swedbank 𝜶 𝜷 𝜶 𝜷 
SEB -0,04685*** 0,68638*** 0,00000 0,72947*** 
Danske Bank -0,06166*** 0,61417*** 0,00000 0,53298*** 
Nordea -0,05279*** 0,84210*** 0,00000 0,70490*** 
     Nordea 𝜶 𝜷 𝜶 𝜷 
SEB -0,04179*** 0,49338*** 0,00000 0,64806*** 
Danske Bank -0,05229*** 0,40221*** 0,00000 0,50913*** 
Swedbank -0,04584*** 0,50485*** 0,00000 0,62176*** 
 
